Aus:
The Money Market Review, 26. Januar 1867. S. 99/100.
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Foreign and Colonial Loans.

Nach Disraeli the financial crisis of 1866 attributable to a want of capital. Now what is the fact? Russia applied to the money market the other day for a loan of 6 Mill. £. St., and immediately capitalists were to be found ready to supply Russia with the amount several times told. Chili demanded 2 millions; 17 were offered in the course of a few days. A small colonial railway – the Melbourne and Hobson’s Bay united – wanted 50,000£, immediately subscribed. Several other Colonial loans immediately supplied. Italy, Portugal, and the Danubian principalities ask for money … If Disraeli had said last August that there was a dearth of security instead of capital, he would have been right. … Colonial Loans the best securities. 6%. They have never failed to meet their engagements. Foreign war for them impossible. The money borrowed by them for railways, harbours, and other productive investments.

Aus:
The Money Market Review, 26. Januar 1867. S. 100/101.
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Overends. Before Court of Chancery.

„It is admitted“, said Vice-Chancellor Malins, „that the old firm of Overend etc was insolvent to the extent of 3 Mill. £, with private property, as a guarantee, upon which there was no lien. No man in his senses, if he had known that, would have taken a single share.“ The prospectus was prepared and put forth by the partners in the old firm, who knew the whole truth, and by the friends whom they had selected and appointed as their colleagues in the direction of the new Co. The future shareholders had no voice in the appointment of these directors, auditors, solicitors, or other officials, nor any opportunity to ascertain the statements of the prospectus. Malins stated: „If the true nature of the suspense amount account of 4 Mill. £ had been stated, one deed would have been sufficient;“ but, as the true nature of that suspense account was to be concealed, two deeds became necessary. „The first deed“, said the Attorney General (Advokat von Oakes, one of the parties who sought to have their names removed from the register of shareholders, and list of contributories in the liquidation) „raised no suspicion that the old firm was insolvent, whilst the second deed, known only to the members of the old firm and the directors of the limited Co., proved that the concern … had not made any profit for years, and was actually in a state of collapse.“ As to the private estates, they were put down as follows:

Landed Estate £.556,000; Personal Property, including chapels! Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen ! £603,000. Reversionary Interests £92,000. Life interests under settlements: £97,000. Moneys in the Norwich Bank: £767,000. Share of goodwill of the Norwich Bank business: £300,000. Zusammen £2,425,000.

Aus:
The Money Market Review, 26. Januar 1867. S. 101/102.
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Consolidation of all Railways of Gr. Brit. under one management.

This suggested by Charles Baylis in a pamphlet, with the general objects of increased facilities for travelling, lower fares and tolls, increased profits, and consolidation of the various stocks and shares, with the view to negotiability.|

In the management of our railway system, there is a vast interest involved, conferring upon the managers large emoluments, and in order to break up and consolidate the existing system, many snug berths must be swept away, and much opposition encountered from the incumbents. The real labour of all railway directorates is performed by efficient officers, which the directors give to their business an occasional hour or two.

Aus:
The Money Market Review, 26. Januar 1867. S. 107.
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Bill Brokering and Money Dealing.

Bill brokering seems to have had its origin with the house of Overend, Gurney, et Co, or their predecessors, Richardson, Overend, et. et Co. (Samuel Gurney ✝ 1856). In later years the confidence in the Overend Gurney led to large accumulation of deposit money in their hands seeking employment from time to time. Money dealing or discounting on their own account, lending on securities or other modes of investment, being found to yield a larger profit than to be derived from simple brokerage business, their transactions gradually took the more lucrative shape, and bill brokering with them was continued only in name. It was their large money dealing business that brought to their doors the surplus funds of bankers and others in town and country, and laid the foundation of the £200,000 per annum they were able at one period to divide.

A broker … one who acts for another, a factor, agent, or intermediate party, who knows who wants to buy in the cheapest market, and who wants to sell in the dearest, any particular commodity, be it a bill or a bale; he concludes a bargain, and thus earns his commission or brokerage. In other words, he reconciles the conflicting interests of buyer and seller. Or he may, without direct communication with either party, as in the article of produce, offer what is to be disposed of to public competition. He is at the same time an irresponsible party, unless where, under exceptional circumstances, he guarantees payment for an extra commission. Bill brokering proper with its 1/8 or 1/4 commission does not admit of such colossal futures being made … As it is conducted at present, the principal part of the profit or discount goes to the bank supplying the money, which probably has a large amount from customers on current account, at little or no interest. The broker – who, by the way, is not strictly speaking a broker at all, but an intermediate discounter – comes in for only what he can make, over and above the rate of discount he has to pay. He does not work for a brokerage or commission upon the amount discounted, or passing from hand to hand, with freedom from responsibility, but is understood to guarantee payment of all bills he may rediscount, either by endorsement or otherwise.