Register der obigen Auszüge aus dem
Economist für 1866 und 1867.
1) Money Market. (1866)
- p. 11, 13, 19, 32, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47. Sharemarket (52) Rise in the Rate of Interest (5 May) (52) Sharemarket (53) State of the City, Panic (53, 54) Money Market 55, 56. Comparative view of Money Market 1856–66 (59, 60) Bankshares (60) Money Market 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91. Reduction of Discount Rate 93 92. Money Market (96, 97, 99, 101, 104, 106, 110) (Bank o. England 110, 111) 117, 118. Rates of Discount on Continent (31)
- Money Market (1866) Before Crisis (1 (Eight P.C)[)], Prospective Value of Money in 1866, p. 1, 3, Investments in 1865 (5), Bubble Cos, 5, 11, 12. Effects of 8% (5) Market Prices of Investments in 1865 (5, 6.) Recent Dividends of Joint Stock Banks (9, 10) Reduction of Discount Rate to 7% (23) to 6% (34)
- B.o.E. Interest on Deposits (36)
2) Crisis of 1866.
- Figures on it (57, 58) Grounds for Confidence (61, 62)
- Crisis of 1866 p. 73, 74, 82–84, 98.
- Ten P.C. p. 73, 75, 76, 78, 82, 81, 88. (Profit et Interest)
- Agra and Masterman’s Bank Failure (69, 70) Its Reaction on India (89)
- Overend et Gurney (71, 72, 95, 100, 108, 109.)
- Protection for Bankshares (70) Dealing in them (Bears) (76) Bulling and Bearing (81, 82) Bill for regulation sale in them (123) Low prices of Bankshares (171, 172)
- Northcote and Gladstone on the Panic (90, 91)
- Circulation of Banknotes since Panic (98)
- Credit Mobilier and Finance Cos. (11, 12, 13, 14) (24, 25)
- Finance Paper and Rate of Discount (48, 49)
- First Interior of a Finance Co (107) Financing Details (177, 178)
- Credit Foncier of England (158, 159)
- Account of Joint Stock Banks (92–93) How a shareholder should watch its Co. (84)
- Liquidation of Bank of London (113)
- What to buy? (G – Gʹ Sich selbst verwerthender Werth) (112)
- Failures (1866) 60, 61, 82, 107, 108. 1867 (p. 153)|
3) Banking and Currency.
- Suspension of the Bankact (57) French Opinion on it (l.c.) Its practical effect (62) New facts relating to it (84). Guthrie etc on Bankact (68) Proposed Inquiry (87)
- Bank of E. and its Bankers Accounts (173, 174, 176) Its Reserve (95, 96) Acceptances and Deposits (117)
- Clearing House (122, 131, 132, 133)
- Billbrokers (1857), Bankers (1866.) [(100)]
- Rediscounting (131)
- Memorial of Liverpool Merchants (Anfang 1866) (p. 7, 8)
- Banking Question (18) Gvt. Notes (117) Mulholland (167, 168.) State and Currency (170, 171)
English Railways. Money Market (1867)
- Savings and Trade (130) Causes of Depression (131, 132, 133, 140) What Bankers should do with their money (157, 169 (Trade), 174, 175 174, 178, 179) Why money dearer in Autumn than Spring (178, 179 179, 180)
- Land bill (54, 55) Law Courts (74) Railways (85) News (96)
- Emigration (21 121, 124, 127, 137)
- Holdings (Parliamentary Return) (1867) [(125)]
- Tenant Report (129) Prussian Rentbanks proposed by Hutton für Ireland (168, 169)
7) Land in England and Agriculture
- Crops and Harvest for 1866 (99, 100) Wheatcrop (1867) (Lawes) (169, 170) Corn Duty (41)
- Cattle Plague. Gvt. Relief (8, 15, 51, 52)
- Cattle feeding (85–86) Supply of Animal Food (62–64)| 185
- Ownership of Land (88, 113, 114, 115, 175) Entails (80, 81)
- English Farmers (12, 13) Tenant Right or Leases (Improbements) (108) Farming of Leicestershire. Grass Land (118, 119) A Territorial Magnate (116, 117, 121) Yearly Tenants (178, 181, 182) Chambers of Agriculture (95)
- Game Laws (18) Ukase (58, 59) Farmers Protest (176 76) Police and Game (122)
- Deerfarmers (42, 43, 67, 68) Deer versus sheep (76, 85)
- Agricultural Labourers: Strikes (12, 40, 53 52, 156) Wages (155, 156)
- Sewage (111) Pollution of Thames (51) Of Lee (146–147)
- Indian Bills (72, 76, 77, 80) East Indian Railway Scandal (50) Railways (87, 88) Money Market (100) Deranged Exchange, action upon English Market (100) Progress (130) Orissa Famine (151–152)
- (Law of Demand and Supply) (105, 110)
- Coal Supply (1–3, 15–17) London Gas (93. 94. 130) Gas (Subways) (159)
- Saving Banks (70) National Debt (117) Frauds of Shopkeepers (110)
- Mortality in England (1865) (168.)
- Trade Returns (29, 30, 33) für 1867 (123, 125) Foreign Trade (115)
- During the Civil War (45, 46) Cotton Market Liverpool May ’66 (56, 61, 66) Cotton. (101) Improved official Statistics wanted (176)
11) Manufacturing Markets
- (1866) (p. 77) und 1867 119, 121. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.
12) Labour, Poor, Conflicts.
- Houses for Poor (21, 22) Torrens Bill (125)
- Workhouse Hospitals (32, 33) Workhouse Reports (152–153) (176)
- Master and Servant (116)
- Industrial Partnership (Fawcett) (103, 104, 115)
- Courts of Arbitration (Mundella) (180, 181)
- Strikes. Iron Workers (112, 113) („Labour mere commodity“ 113.) 118.
- Trades Unions: Commission (120, 125) Effect on Wages (150–1) (155) Money and Trades Unions (170) Finance of Trades’ Unions (172, 173)|
13) United States.
- Trade with America (4) French Commerce with U. States (7) Protectionism (15)
- Finance: 41, 42, 113. Revenue (19–21) Taxation (137, 154–55, 159–160, 180.[)]
- Banking: Evidences of Pressure (1867) (128, 129, 133–136) Shipbuilding (126, 127) American inconvertible Currency (45) Antidote against Commercial failures (119, 120) Sound state of American Banking (1866) (26–28) Apprehended commercial convulsion (38) Why no Panic in America (1866) (78–80) National Banks (137–140) (140–146) (148–149) Failures of Nl. Banks (1867) (157, 158, 165, 166)
- American Public Schools (162–3) Waste of Educational Resources [(]in Engld.) (163–4)
- Finance (Michell) (23, 24) (160–161)
- Bank Inquiry (22, 23, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45, 114, 124, 127.[)] Bk.o.F. (68)
- Effect of Overend’s Failure (64)
- Pereires (168)
- Bankruptcy of Pollet, Roubaix Banker (153)
- Failures in Building Speculation (156)
- Fraud in Cognac (168 68)
- Tableau Général du Commerce (120. 122)
- Agriculture (34) Beet root sugar (120)
- Aneline (120)
- Bonaparte’s Cost to Europe (169)
- Iron, Coal, Means of Transport and their effect. (148)
- Production of Iron (1860–1866) (176)
Market Review“. Jahrgang 1866.
Saturday. May 19. 1866. N. 311. Panic.
Bank o. E.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 659.
On Friday evening (11. May) Gladstone stated in the H.o.C. that the reserve of the B.o.E. fell that day from close upon 6 millions to 3, and the Bank Return shows that in the course of the entire week it has fallen from nearly 6 millions to one. The demand for loans, after removal of Bank Act ⦗a few hours more of intense panic would have absorbed this reserve altogether⦘ during the week more than 10 millions, greater than ever known in any previous week of the Bank[’]s history.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 659/660.
The Recent Panic and Bank Act Suspension.
Kein solcher Panic seit 1825. For a long time previously, day after day, and week after week, persistent endeavours in the Times to bring all the financial associations into disrepute. Continual repetition of damaging insinuations could not fail to prove injurious to the credit of these Cos. and depreciate to some extent the value of their shares, as well as the value of the securities on which their advances had been made. When the favourable moment arrived, therefore, when the disreputable doings of the Joint Stock Discount Co. and the Contract Corporation had excited a large amount of public suspicion and distrust, and the imminence of a great Continental War was added, the speculators for a fall in the Stock Exchange had every inducement to extend immensely their operations, and every reason to calculate upon their success. These operations, it is said, have resulted in the realisation of large fortunes by many of the adverse speculators. For the Cos which were at all „financially weak“ – the effect was crushing. The depreciation in the market price of their shares was certain to be accompanied by a corresponding depreciation in the market value of the securities on which their investments had been made, and the depreciation of both led their customers to a withdrawal of deposits. This the result calculated upon by the speculators, and enforced. But as the conduct of these unscrupulous gamblers, that of some directors of these Cos has been infinitely more reprehensible. It is freely said that some of these directors, like certain animals which are known to follow in the trail of other beasts of prey, more savage and courageous than themselves, for the chance of partaking of the offal that may be left behind, have been following the lead of the Bears, and selling on Speculation the shares of their own Cos. These have been attempted to justify or palliate on the shallow pretext. Feeling certain that the operations of the „bears“ must frighten the public and induce them to sell, and a fall of prices must therefore ensue, they have followed the movement and have sold also, thereby accelerating and increasing the fall. Suchten dieß to justify or palliate on the shallow pretence that, by subsequently buying back their shares at the reduced prices and whilst pocketing the profits – or, in other words, sharing with the bears in the plunder of their own shareholders they have been sustaining the market.
On Thursday, the 10, the panic, which till then might be said to be still „looming in the distance“, fairly set in: at 1/2 4 o’clock had culminated in the stoppage of Overend, Gurney, et Co. News flew like wildfire in all directions, in an instant telegraphed to all parts of the country. Dense masses congregated in the streets around the doors. It was clearly perceived that this Overend stoppage would be the signal for the commencement on the following morning of a „run“ upon every other banking and financial establishment, whose credit had been called into question. „Not even in the panics of 1847 and 1857“, said the Daily News, „was the apprehension shown this day equalled. The circulation of mercantile bills, however good, is completely paralysed. Merchants who have the most |188 undoubted paper find themselves under the risk of inability to meet their engagements by reason of the partial or complete collapse of the money market.“ Even the Times City Editor declared that „unless prompt steps were taken, the close of that week would be marked by disasters such as had never been equalled in our commercial history“. Means must be devised, he urged, for stemming the insane torrent of the panic, or it „would not only affect the metropolis and all the great provincial centres of our commerce, as well as our Indian colonial and the foreign markets, but would at once lead to a suspension of public works throughout the kingdom, and in every district throw thousands of people out of employment.“
The time for action had arrived. The only action possible was, in the first instance, a deputation to Gladstone (Chancellor of the Exchequer) composed of representatives of the leading institutions and firms of the City, to urge him, not in terms to suspend the Bk. Act again, but in fact and in effect to supersede it. Friday Morning (11 May) came the anticipated run upon the other banks and financial institutions, and such a pressure upon the discount Department of the B.o.E. as had never been experienced before. Under this pressure the Bk. raised the rate of discount from 8 to 9%, and as regards advances on stock to 10%, and even upon those exorbitant terms it was only on the most unexceptionable bills that money could be obtained. Partially known on Thursday evening the closure of the Joint Stock Bank, its liabilities only about 8 Mill. £. This announcement was followed on Friday Morning (11 May) by the suspension of Peto, Betts, and Co (mit liabilities to £4,000,000) and of W. Shrimpton, railway contractor, for £200,000. In the course of the day it became known that Imperial Mercantile Credit Association had succumbed, the Consolidated Discount Co. has suspended. Several banks severely pressed, but the „run“ was well met. Lombard-Street was thronged in a most extraordinary manner by crowds and gazers, watching the movements at several banks. So great these crowds that the streets almost impassable … constant streams of depositors and customers with anxious faces as they passed and repassed through the doorways of the banks …
Several informal communications from the bankers of the City made to Gladstone during the day, urging the immediate suspension of the Bank Act, but the Bank (o. E.) Directors had made no application, nor expressed any desire on that subject, and Gladstone unwilling to determine anything without some formal application. In the meantime the pressure upon the Discount Department of the Bank such as without parallel in all its previous history. In that single day the Bank extended its loans and discounts to a sum of more than £4,000,000, so as to reduce the reserve from 5 millions and 3/4 mill. to about 3 millions. These facts communicated to Gladstone on Friday evening, and on that evening Gladstone was waited upon by a deputation representing the Joint Stock Banks in the City, who were more urgent for a suspension of the Act. Gladstone then decided to send suspensory letter to Governor and Deputy Governor of the B.o.E. He announced this to the H. o. Commons on Friday (same day of 11 May) night. … Thus the Bankact for 3d time suspended.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 660/661.
The Panic and its Remedy.
If the Bankact had not been suspended then, the
B.o.E. itself would have forewith forthwith suspended payment. Three millions out of a reserve of
less than 6 mill. went on Friday, and, with a panic becoming more
intense every hour as the reserve attenuated, there is no doubt that
before the close of banking business on Saturday the
B. o. Egd.
must have closed its doors. Von Marx übernommen in seinen Brief an Collet Dobson Collet
vom 13. November 1868.
Schließen If the leading members of Gvt had been out of the way, as is sometimes the case when Parliament is not sitting, … the B.o.E. would have stopped payment. It certainly seems strange that the commerce of a great commercial nation should be paralysed because a Minister or two might not be at their posts; but the law, as it stands, may entail a catastrophe thus momentous for a cause so insignificant.
Jezt sagen die defenders des Act of 1844: its peculiar advantage is that it will stop any Panic as soon as the Act is defunct. … The speculation in cotton, in produce, in iron; the institution of Finance Cos., „Lloyds Bonds“, and contractors’ loans, are certainly not the inventions of the Act of 1844. |189 The „phantom“ Reserve of B.o.E. Notes had suddenly fallen to such a panic point as induced a scramble for the Remnant. … Attempt to limit the supply of money, when it was most needed.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 661/662.
What to do with the Act of 1844?
It does no harm so long as it is doing nothing; it never does any good; it never comes into actual operation without producing evil. It is raising the Bank rate of discount that checks a foreign drain upon our gold reserves, and checks and moderates undue speculation, when it is to be checked … . It is most humiliating to reflect – that the whole of the banking, and financial, and trading interests of this country should hang suspended in the feeble grasp of a body of bank directors, supposed ⦗by the defenders of the Act⦘ to be perpetually oscillating between abject fear and reckless indiscretion. … Banks and bankers imagine that the Bank Act works well for them, and for all the money-lending community, however hardly it may operate upon the money-borrowing public, by keeping up and raising to a permanently higher level the value of loanable money. … The tendency of these frequently recurring periods of pressure and panic is to convert the industrious and enterprising classes into speculative and reckless gamblers …
The landed interest owns less than 1/6 of the national wealth, and pays less than 1/6 of the national taxation.
dieser Überschrift versammelten Exzerpte verwendete Marx
ausführlich im Brief an Collet Dobson Collet vom 13. November
Schließen The Times and the
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 662–664.
Schließen Influence that Journal can exercise in bringing about a panic.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 662–664.
Schließen On Thursday evening (10 May) frigtened frightened by the Panic wants something official being done[,] urges deputations from leading banks and firms to press at once upon the Chancellor of Exchequer, warns the Gvt etc[.]
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 662–664.
Schließen Friday night (11 May) Bank Act suspended. Saturday Morning (12 May) Times declares that the suspension was not necessary, „and if, as we expect, confidence be speedily restored, we shall attribute it to natural causes rather than to the interference of the Executive Gvt … The Panic would have subsided of itself.“ „The suspension of the Act coincided with the Restoration of Confidence. Confidence would have been surely and speedily restored had the law been preserved in all its integrity.“
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 662–664.
Schließen Monday Morning (13 May) ⦗in point of fact, already in its evening edition of Saturday⦘: „To suppose that the panic could have subsided of itself, especially when the news of the condition of London, and of the State of the Bank Reserve had reached the provinces, would have been tantamount to waiting for a miracle.“ And in its leader columns on the same day: „The panic far exceeded the proportions to which delicacy and discretion reduced it in the newspapers, though even they told a sad tale.“ „The concession of the Chancellor of the Exchequer came not an hour too early.“
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 687/688.
Schließen It was falsely announced that the Ambassadors of Prussia and Austria had mutually withdrawn. Hence perturbation on the Stock Exchange. Then the Times announcement that „there was not one word of truth in the announcement“.
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 687/688.
Schließen Times City Article of 25 May. Zusammenfassung von Marx.
Schließen Again an article, full of „deliberately false and grossly exaggerating representations of the affairs in the City“, with the transparent purpose to „write up“ the Panic, and set it again a-going. In that article it is said: „The authority to suspend the Bk. Act has not allayed the panic … the state of embarrassment at the present moment seems to have reached a much worse point than before.“
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 688/689.
Schließen In another article the Times has the impudence to represent the „distressed“ London bankers as begging assistance from the B.o.E., while they were calling for „their“ money at the Bank. Speaks of „bankers in distress“, while the B.o.E. was the Bank „in distress“.
The Money Market Review, 4. August 1866. S. 132/133.
Schließen The Money Market Review: „City article of Monday“. Gemeint war also die Ausgabe der „Times“ vom 30. Juli 1866.
Schließen On the 1st August (City article) (on occasion of Mr. Watkin’s motion for a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Bank Act) the Times Zusammenfassende Bemerkung von Marx.
Schließen declares all Inquiry useless, and the Act perfect.
The Money Market Review, 4. August 1866. S. 131/132.
Schließen On the Siehe The Times, 2. August 1866. S. 8.
Schließen 2nd August it says: (Leading Article) „The fortunate possessors of capital and credit, whether in Threadneedlestreet or Lombardstreet, sit aloof and administer their power upon purely selfish principles. When money is abundant, they underbid one another, and the B.o.E. lends at 2%, thereby encouraging speculation. When the evil tree is beginning to bear its evil fruit; when enterprise has gone to its utmost limits; when money is gone and ordinary credit falls into suspicion, then the Bank of England trafficks upon the fatal excesses it has provoked, and exacts 10% from its own victims. The other moneylenders do the same, but it is the Bank that sets the example. As a public institution it realises the questionable maxim that private vices are public benefits, for it thrives upon the folly of private speculators, and the 10% which accumulates the Bank ‚Rest‘ and raises the price of Bankstock to £250 means universal difficulty and general disaster. Certainly, there is something invidious in being the chief example of a trade the profit of which is founded upon misfortune.“|
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 664.
Investors Losses from „Bear“ Frights.
Recently the current of speculation in the Stock Exchange has set all one way. Prices have fallen – in some instances on merits; z.B. für die Joint Stock Discount shares und Contract Corporation Shares. But upon this comparatively small basis the Stock Exchange „bears“ have erected a huge structure intended to crush all finance and discount Cos. … The bears of the hour not only sell as the old „bears“ were wont to sell, but they combine, and sell in masses, and they back up their sales by endless rumours. If one Co. makes a call, all are reported to be likely to make calls. If „Lloyd’s Bonds“ are held largely by One Co., all are said to hold „Lloyd’s Bonds“. If one Co. has railway contractors for creditors, all are reported to „be in“ deeply with railway contractors. In the peculiarly sensitive condition of the market at present a few rumours of this description, coupled with a smart decline in the price of the shares, bring real and frightened sellers into the market; whereupon depositors get frightened also, and a complete panic sets in. … There has, during the last week, been a dead set against the Alliance Bank, the Agra and Masterman’s Bank, the Credit Foncier and Mobilier of England.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 664.
The Stock Markets of the Week.
Gvt. Stocks have had a great rally, despite the immense sales forced by banks in hourly fear of a „run“. That investment has been rapidly absorbed by the public, and Consols are restored to a very fair price for a 3% security. … The public have eagerly taken all the Railway Stock which a pressure from the North had thrown upon the market. London Chatham and Dover stock has risen. The German sales of American Stocks seem for the moment suspended, while the American demand continues, so that 5-20 Bonds have shared, although very meagrely, in the general rise.
The variations in Agra and Masterman’s Bank shares tremendous, but after touching 20, the price seems now recovering. In London and County Bank Shares recovery of £10. Speculators for a fall in Consolidated Bank shares were forced last „account“ to pay 10s. „backwardation“.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 664/665.
The Limited Liability Act of 1862.
So far, indeed, it seems passed for the especial benefit of clever promoters, financiers, and liquidators to the injury of the real investors. The liability, in many instances, has operated as a share. The bona fide shareholder has practically no protection against either unscrupulous directors or against a wholesale system of nominees or „men of straw“, put up as his co-partners in Cos. which have only a trifling amount of capital paid up. Thus the so called Reserve of unpaid capital may be no reserve at all. No real audit. There are some figures which must be published at least once a year; but, in some instances, if not absolutely false they have been grossly deceptive, and in nearly all cases, they are grouped under a few heads in such a way as to convey little or no information – not even to the most acute accountant in the world – as to the real character, or the extent of the commitments of the Co. The securities held against advances sometimes actually involve a liability, and may, in fact, become heavy liabilities instead of securities, without the shareholders having slightest idea of such a risk. … On the creditor side of the account should be given the amount of advances on securities not fully paid up, on securities of works in progress, and on securities representing fully paid up shares in Cos. or Loans brought out by the Co. distinct from those of other cos., also, the amount of cash at call, at interest, also that at the B.o.E., and in hand.
The shareholders selbst grossen Theils am Dreck Schuld. They blindly support directors who admit having transacted such a description of business that secrecy is actually necessary to preserve the Co. as well as the client. Shareholders are led away by plausible observations from the directors as to the evils of exposing details to the public or their rivals; recent disclosures have proved that secrecy allows unprincipled directors and managers to carry on abominably reckless transactions, of which the shareholders are in ignorance until the Co. is ruined. Even when it is ruined, a balance-sheet in accordance with the requirements of the present Act can at the very last moment be issued, showing a profitable position, as was the case with the Joint Stock Discount Co. With regard |191 to the appointment and re-election of directors (the latter being a ceremony which has almost degenerated into a mere form) they are selected because of their names being prominent as guinea-pigs, oder weil sie political, municipal, official, und mercantile duties have in combination with the responsibilities of a directorship over 5, 10, 15 other cos of varying nature with the most diversified objects. There should also be an end to reserve funds being used as capital. If it be clear profit, and is yet wanted for use in the business, let it be added to the paid up capital or invested so a as to prove a real reserve fund in case of need.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 665/666.
Schließen (don’t pay)
In these 25 years we have more than doubled our wealth. Sicher the securities which represent about 450 millions of Railway properties would not realise at the existing market rate their original cost. The investors in British railway property are losers. For many years past subscribers for new railways could not be found. There were, however, lawyers, contractors, and promoters. Devices invented whereby, by „Lloyd’s Bonds“ and Finance Cos., and the issue of railway securities at enormous discounts, and the payment to contractors of prices for their work and materials far in excess of the value, some railways have been made, or partly made. But, as Lord Redesdale said in the H. o. Lords last Monday, the system has fairly broken down.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 666/667.
The Reports of the Asiatic Banking Co., and the Bank of Hindostan, China
and Japan (Limited.)
The disastrous crisis at Bombay last year (1865) has told upon the balance sheets and dividends of the various Indian Banks. All have suffered, some severely. Mit Numerous failures amongst firms of the highest standing and greatest repute, and prolonged depreciation of all description of Indian produce the Banks could not escape heavy losses. So sehr bedeutende losses der „Commercial Bank Corporation of India and the East“, ebenso, obgleich nicht so groß, in den beiden oben genannten Banks. Losses of Asiatic Banking Co: £142,000 against profits realised of £61,494. Hatte aber, fortunately, reserve fund of £175,000.
Net profits of the Bank of Hindostan etc for the year £23,485, whole swallowed up by the losses, which have also absorbed £87,794 transferred from the reserve fund. In addition, £70,000 loss anticipated. Sonst sound.
The Money Market Review, 19. Mai 1866. S. 668.
The Economy of B.o.E. Notes. 1000£ Notes.
The B.o.E. directors suchen constantly economy of banknotes, so as to keep as small an amount as possible in the hands of the public, and as many in the reserve as they can contrive. A large amount of the whole circulation, perhaps 1/10 (say 2 mill. £. St.) consists of notes of £1000 each, and nearly all these are in the tills of bankers within half a mile of Lothbury. They are of little or no use, except to settle balances among the banking houses themselves, or occasionally for lawyers to pass when they sell real estate.
May 26, 1866. N. 312.
The Money Market Review. 26. Mai 1866. S. 688/689.
The Bank of England and the London Bankers in the
Friends of the Bankact of 1844: If it has been suspended, it has not failed; if it has failed, it was good, very good, that it should have failed; and that it fails as beautifully and beneficently as it operates. Economist selbst muß aber sagen: „Indeed if it had not been broken this month it must have been repealed next month. The panic took the matter in its own hands.“
In the letter of the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank to the Chancellor of Exchequer , on the 11. May, they have the impudence to state: „We commenced this morning with a reserve of £5,727,000, which had been drawn upon so largely that we cannot calculate upon having so much as 3 Mill. £. St. this evening, making a fair allowance for what may be remaining at the branches, and unless the money taken from the Bank is entirely withdrawn from circulation there is no |192 reason to suppose that this reserve is insufficient.“ Dieß als »Troops of bankers were coming up from all parts of the country in order to provide themselves with gold and banknotes.[«] The balances of the London Bankers, lodged in the B.o.E., usually from 3 to 5 Mill., and it was clear that, had the Bank Act not been suspended, they would have been compelled to withdraw every 6d. of those balances to meet a tremendous „run“. All those balances must have come out of the Bank reserve of 3 Mill. £.
The Deputy Governor of the Bank was exceedingly reluctant at the conference with Gladstone to admit that there was any necessity whatever for the suspension of the Act, until he was curtly reminded by one of the joint-stock bank directors present that „they could draw a couple of cheques to-morrow morning, which would compel the B.o.E. to close its doors“. Gladstone interposed, „but you will not do it“.
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 689/690.
Lord Clarendon on
The panic of 1866 possesses one essential characteristic which did not belong to its predecessors. Continental capitalists have in this instance become alarmed, and, contrary to all precedent, on the seeming verge of a colossal European war, withdraw their money from London as a measure of security, instead of sending it to London for safety, as in previous periods of convulsion. Clarendon , on the morning after the issue of the Gvt. letter, indited his circular to the British embassies and legations throughout Europe, with the view of staying undue panic on the Continent as to British solvency.
We have been taught to think that the withdrawal of a million or two of bullion from the Bank of England is a very serious affair, and that the addition of a million or 2 is the occasion for national congratulation. … The precious metals always have and always will flow backwards and forwards from one country to another, and all law is powerless to stem this natural course … Clarendon tells Europe that long-continued prosperity in commercial affairs and the general wealth consequent on it have produced their ordinary results in encouraging speculation, especially of a monetary and financial character, and in fostering hopes of acquiring wealth by more speedy means than are presented by ordinary methods of commercial industry. …
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 690/691.
Transfer of Business of the Bank of London to the Consolidated Bk.
The London Bank Reserve Fund in its last
balance-sheet upwards of £300,000. In April 1864
it paid dividends at the rate of 15% p. annum, price of its shares £122,
or £72 premium und damals addition of £200,000 made to the
capital by the creation and issue of 2000 new shares. These shares
issued to the then existing shareholders at premium
of £70 p. share, and the £140,000 realised by these premiums
was carried to the reserve funds. At its last half yearly meeting paid
dividend of 20%. Zusammenfassung von Marx in eigenen
Schließen Came to deadlock by The Money Market Review: dealing
Schließen dabbling in financial transactions. Zusatz von Marx. The Money Market Review: Such an arrangement is somewhat novel and curious, but, under the circumstances, it is perhaps the best that could have been made.
Schließen Dummes arrangement mit der Consolidated Bank. Transfer ihr 22 May, evening, the current and deposit accounts of their customers mit ample assets to cover them. Consolidated Bk. undertook the charge of these accounts, but assumed no responsibility für die acceptances der B. o. London. Diese daher unpaid return. Kommentar von Marx. The Money Market Review: it must be owned that some very nice legal points might be raised in regard to this arrangement, were it worth the while of any party to raise them.
Schließen ⦗Dieß ungesetzlich; giving one creditor privilege gegen den other.⦘ Der Fehler to invest Banking Funds, which may be any day withdrawn, upon Railway Contracts or Lloyds Bonds, or other securities based on public works in a progressive but unfinished state. These works may be long in progress, the capital to complete them may not be readily obtainable, the works may never be finished. Until their completion all such securities not only liable to great fluctuation in value, but extremely difficult to deal with as available securities, even if they can be dealt with, as such, at all.
It is the business of a financial association to lend money, or lend its credit for the raising of money, upon securities not immediately convertible, and repayable at longer dates than those at which a banker justified in lending his money. The financial association, lending at longer dates, and on less marketable securities, incurs therefore greater risk, and obtains therefore larger profits than the banker. If the business well managed, higher profits cover the larger possible losses, and enable it to pay higher interest and dividends to the shareholders. But the financial association ought not to take deposits repayable on demand, or at short notice, because their investments not immediately convertible, in case of emergency for the repayment of these deposits. The mischiefs of intermingling the system of the Banking institution mit financial operations lamentably illustrated in the cases of the Joint Stock Discount Co. and the Bk. of London, the London Financial and the Imperial Mercantile Credit Associations.|
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 690/691.
Loss in Investments since beginning of 1866 – May
The recent failures and the general depreciation in the value of joint stock investments, since the commencement of the present year, has involved loss at 130 mill. £. St.
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866, S. 692/693.
The Stock Markets of the Week.
A steady drain of bullion to the Continent continues, partly to pay for the stock with which Continental holders have lately loaded our market, and partly because the machinery of the Foreign Exchanges is out of gear. Consols are weaker, but only to a trifling extent.
The speculators for a fall have altogether had a good harvest the this week. Individuals or cliques sell in combination large quantities of shares in an undertaking whose very existence depends upon its credit, and then comment on the depreciation in price which they have caused, in a way to bring the credit of such concern into question, and cap the whole proceeding by circulating false and defamatory reports. It is said that men of high standing in the City of London are not ashamed to pocket the profits of these transactions. Such men pick out a high priced bank as their next victim, and repurchase with glee the stock out of which they have frightened timid shareholders.
With the exception of Italian, which seems to have fallen as low as it well can go, Foreign Stocks are all weaker. The fall in Railway Stocks very severe. London and Northwestern have been the greatest sufferers.
The great interest of the week has centered in the market for Bankshares, where the fluctuations have been terrible. The crisis under which India is still suffering afforded a pretext for heavy sales of Agra and Masterman[’]s shares, touched at one time 10l. per share, or 15 discount; but a great rebound has taken place, and they close at £20.
Persons who have locked up their property in their cash-boxes can so invest mit immense profits.
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 694/695.
What is a Five-Twenty Bond? Zusatz von
Schließen (Neue Art Convertibility for paper
The Gvt of the U. States have the option of redeeming this part of their debt at par, or 100, after 5 years from the date of issue, and at any period between 5 years and 20 [years] from the date of issue; but, at the expiration of the 20 years, the holder of five-twenty bonds can claim the principal or par value. Similar condition für die ten-forty Bonds, the option of the State continuing in this case after the first 10 years up to 40 years. On both these kinds of bonds the interest is payable in gold, on the former at 6, on the latter at 5% p. annum.
Seventy-thirty Bonds: Interest on them payable in greenbacks, at the rate of 73/10% p. an. (say 7$ 30 cents p. 100 dollars). These bonds exchangeable, at the option of the holder, after 3 years from the date of issue, into five-twenty bonds. By the last advices the relative prices of five-twenty and ten-forty bonds in New York were 102 und 96. Before long – das scheme schon brought forward by McCulloch, the Gvt. will issue a 5% stock at par, and thus exercise the option they have of paying off the five-twenty 6% or substituting a 5% in their place. Chase gave the holders of „greenbacks“ the option of conversion into five-twenties. He could not make his „greenbacks“ equal in value to gold, but to five-twenties, and that he did; and so he paid for the greatest and the most costly war the world ever knew. This is a form of convertibility for paper currency never before devised. But the money was raised at war rates. A „greenback“ issued in payment for cannon and gunpowder when gold was at 100% premium was, when converted into five-twenties, virtually raised at 12%. The purchase-power of the „greenback“ was only 50 p. 100, and upon that 100 6% interest was payable p. annum. Um später dieß to correct hielt Chase dem Staat die option der Rückzahlung etc vor. Mr. Chase’s option of redemption in 5 or 10 years, will be found supremely economical; in the course of a few years we may see a 41/2 or 5% stock substituted for the existing 6% five-twenties and ten-forties.|
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 695/696.
The Annual Circular of the American
Commercial Agency. Zusatz von Marx.
Issued from New York. The American Commercial Agency erstreckt sich nicht nur auf U. States, sondern auch British North American Provinces. The review takes the form of an everyday ledger account, the substance of what is known in favour of and against all large merchants and shopkeepers being regularly entered up. This Agency has long proved a terror to mercantile evil doers. In no large American town is it possible for anyone to embark in business without receiving an early call from a representative of the Agency, who puts questions about the previous place of business of the members of the firm, their capital, and their expectations. Into the ledger of the Agency the answers are duly posted, and beneath them such corroboration as the Agency may think proper to obtain. All the entries, in the name of any firm, are accessible to the other firms connected with the Agency, but inaccessible to the firm concerned. (Der Economist hat aus diesem Annual Circular Zahlen über die American failures genommen.) The considerable increase of failures in 1865, compared mit 63’ und 64’, is chiefly to be accounted for by the depreciation of the Currency.
The circulation, in England, as in New York, of a kind of Lloyd’s register of the seaworthiness of firms, would provoke proceedings in the Courts of Law. But as long as we resist the supervision of the Agency, and America submits to it, wir haben keinen Grund für our aspersions on American credit.
In diesem Augenblick great Consignments von Liverpool to New York. Diese consignments are stored in the bonded warehouses, for payment of duties; and the large amount of those duties keeps the market itself bare of stocks. Where realisations are demanded, such consignments take precedence of other sales, and a slight advantage in price – i.e., a moderate discount – universally attracts the jobbers. It is absolutely prejudicial to the standing of a firm to realise on terms of sacrifice; and no house of respectability will obey such instructions. Das Circular sagt u.a: „From all points of view, the prospect warrants the conclusion that the entire production in the U. States in 1866 will be nearly, if not quite double that of 1865.“ Dießmal, nach Ende des Kriegs, very few „drummers“ (commercial travelers) have been sent from the North to the South, sondern der South has gone to the North. Southern buyers have revisited the North, and made their own proposals to sellers. To New new and unknown men sales have chiefly taken the form of cash or produce, or collateral security of some kind – the assignment of planters’ notes, or mortgages, or of merchants’ notes, or mortgages. Old and known men well received, when they appeared with proposals for immediate or partial liquidation of old claims; but there has been no pressing of sales, as in former days.
The opening words of the Annual Circular state that last year (1865) was one of remarkable success in all commercial pursuits, or that seldom or ever has the increase in the surplus of merchants been so considerable or so universal.
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 697.
Act of 1844 and Bank of England.
Our trade £500,000,000 p.a., und amount of capital held on deposit in Bank, payable at demand, not less than 400 Mill. £. St. Surely of greater moment that convertibility should be preserved for such a mass of capital than £7,000,000 should be locked up in the B.o.E. as security for the note.
Nach der Theory des Acts von 1844 the value of money should fluctuate and depend on the variations in the currency. 2 August 1865 Bankreserve £6,461,318, rate of discount 4%. On 9 May 1866 Bankreserve £5,811,745, rate of discount 8%, showing a reduction of £649,573 in the amount of reserve, and an advance of 100% in the value of money. The theory, therefore, of regulating the value of money by the amount of reserve admits of the most capricious exercise.
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 697.
A Pluralist Director.
Thomas Dakin, alderman of the City of London, is a director und auditor in some 20 or 30 Cos, was a druggist, but left that to go to the directories, derives some 1000£ a year from it.|
The Money Market Review, 26. Mai 1866. S. 697.
The Directors of failed
The bears may make a dead set at the shares of the Bank of London and the Agra and Masterman, but they know that some of the directors of both these banks are directors of the Imperial Mercantile Credit Association , who managed in January last to carry forward a supposed sum of £100,000 undivided profit; in April to make a call equal in amount to the paid-up capital; and in May to wreck the Co.
June 2, 1866. N. 313.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 720.
John C. G. Hubbard, M.P. On the Bank Act and the
Currency. (Letter to the Times on 14 May.)
He brings the
pretentions of the Act down to one single principle „that of securing the convertibility of the banknote“. Aber
dieß is no principle at all. Die absolute practical
convertibility nur to be secured by limiting the
issues of notes to the amount of gold available for the
purpose; whereas the Act of 1844 authorises the issue of 14 mill. £ Notes
Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (jezt 15) beyond that amount. Hubbard avows that the promoters of the Act „confidently affirmed that, with the enactment which limited all the credit issues of the country, and secured the convertibility of the notes of the B.o.E., would result an immunity from speculations, crises, and panics.“ Aber, sagt Hubbard, in fact: „The Act professed to quiet panics only where panic arose from suspicion as to the validity of the B.o.E. note.“ What necessity, then, for passing the Act? Was the note „suspect“ in 1844? No panic ever did arise from such suspicion. Hubbard sagt: „Men now transact business to 10 × and 20 × the measure of their means; in banking the uninvested deposits are committed on interest to a money broker, who, gathering the surplus of many bankers, lends them against higher interest, and without reserve, so that, when the depositor calls upon the banker and the banker upon the broker, the broker is unable to refund.“
It is the limitation of Bank note issues which causes and aggravates panics, and it is not that limitation which stops a drain of gold, whether internal or external, which is the main object Hubbard has in view. It is the rate of discount which effects that object now, und it can do it without the limitation of issues. The rate of discount, regulated by the reserve of gold, is sufficient.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 720–722.
The Theory of Panic etc.
All traders require a reserve of ready cash; this reserve[, instead] of being kept about the person or in some hiding place, is put into a bank. The banker can afford to pay the possessor something for the use of it, and makes a profit upon lending it again. Those to whom the banker lends again make use of the money and again make profit; and so it goes on, and the first deposit with a banker is used over and over again. This is credit. Upon this credit basis our trade has increased and wealth accumulated. A cheque upon a banker answers the purpose of banknotes; and the substitution of cheques for banknotes during the past 20 years has enabled us to dispense with banknotes. There are „banking facilities“. In a word, increased banking is increased currency. The restricted currency of the Bankact of 1844 has been corrected by increased banking faculties. … In the ordinary course bankers can calculate with tolerable accuracy the average deposits of their customers. If the balance of one customer is smaller than usual, that of another is larger, and the medium average is fairly calculable. Bankers, therefore, as a rule, lend again the loans of their depositors, retaining as a reserve for emergencies 10 to 12% of the whole, and thus, in an average condition of credit, the same deposits of a banker are used over again performing the functions of currency by cheques equally with banknotes. … In Zeit of discredit, wie jezt: Our currency, as expressed by bankers’ balances, is thus, or has been, in process of contraction, and, in proportion as deposits are withdrawn by timid customers, bankers have less and less to lend. Moreover, if some depositors draw out money from banks, others may; and bankers must be more cautious than usual, and must increase their reserves by holding more notes and gold. The whole credit machine has been put out of gear … The deposits mit British bankers probably 200 mill. or more. What |196 portion of this currency of credit is now practically extinguished by the panic no one can tell … The 20 or 25 Mill. of Bk.o.E. notes nominally constituting the chief paper currency of the country, is a mere bagatelle by comparison mit other forms of credit fulfilling the functions of currency … Destroy this banking system by impaired credit, and the chief part of this form of currency is swept away. This is panic. … In France the credit-structure is diminutive by comparison with our own, and consequently there is much less open to destruction when discredit comes, and much less room for discredit …
By law of 1844, in this country, the basis of all our credit is made the accidental cash balance at the Bk. of England. By this law, and the usages of that law, cash balance of 20 mill., or so much gold und silver at the Bank o. E., is considered more than ample for any superstructure of credit, and British bankers lend 100, 200, or 300 mill. of deposit freely, and the rate of discount low. It is a question [of] how borrowers can be found. On the other hand, metallic cash balance at B.o.E. of only 10 Mill. £, instead of 20, is regarded as ruinous, and the credit fabric vanishes. British bankers lend nothing, call in their outstanding debts, lose their deposits, and make panic; then the question arises where lenders are to be found of any money on any security. The bankers cannot lend. Both ridiculous extremes, they belong alone to the law of 1844.
French commerce has not been educated by law to build much upon a purely accidental stock of bullion, whether large of small. Our banking facilities are virtually a system of currency, open to extreme expansion and contraction. Its expansion within reasonable terms assists national progress; undue contraction of credit checks it. Under law of 1844, the expansion and contraction of credit and currency are made to rest chiefly upon the accidental stock of the precious metals at the Bk.o.E.
A paper pound sterling is not a pound sterling if not convertible into a coined piece of gold such as it professes to represent; and, therefore, the price of gold must continue to express the precise value of the paper promise. But it is a question whether this ought to be more than an expression of value.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 722.
Board of Trade Returns.
The anomaly is that, while we are receiving enormous quantities of cotton from America, we are also drawing heavy amounts of gold from her.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 722/723.
Consolidate Bank formed of amalgamations at different times between the Bank of Manchester, a Joint Stock Bank, and the private firms of Heywood, Kennard et Co (Manchester) and Messrs. Hankey et Co.
Bank of Manchester established 1829, stopped payment in 1842, suspended business. Reopened in 1852, carried on with profit. In 1860 adopted itself to the Liability Act of 1858 , nearly doubled its shareholders, increased largely current and deposit account. Shares of £10 each, on which £4 paid. 1 Jan. 1863 fusion mit Heywood, Kennard et Co, Lombardstreet. The business of Hankey, established nearly 200 years, was amalgamated in August 1863. Neue shares. Branch established in Norwich. The partners of the private banks became directors of the „Consolidated“. In Sept. 1863 Mr. Brone selected as manager. Die Bank zahlte seit June 1863 10% for year, 1864 161/4% und 1865 161/4%. The deposits held nach last return £3,037,436 und die acceptances £780,564. 22 May 1866 announced on the doors of the Bk. of London that the Consolidated Bank (lim.) had taken possession, and would „protect“ the current and deposit accounts of the B. o. London. Step led to difficulties. Shut on May 27.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 723/724.
American Exchanges and Grain Trade.
Owing to the backwardness of the American spring, the influence of the American Grain Trade will not be felt upon the exchanges until middle or end of June. In other words, until then there will not be any considerable amount of grain bills offering in New York on London, either to operate as set-offs against our shipments of merchandise, or against our transfer of U. St. and other securities for realisation at the other side … This year Canada comes in direct trade mit England, durch abolition des reciprocity treaty mit den U. St. Under that treaty, the bulk of the produce of Canada passed into consumption in the U. St, and was paid either in cash or by draft on New York, daher in former years stets numerous Canada bills in New York …|197
In the course of last season the oldest fashioned goods – goods of all kinds which had been unsaleable for years – were cleared out in Canada for cash at high prices to American buyers.
From best information, probable that the American grain trade of 1866 will fall below the usual average. … it is stated in New York that shipments of flour from the French ports to New York are either in contemplation or in progress. … the wet weather, during and after last harvest, destroyed large quantities of wheat; in consequence, good wheat is scare scarce, and sought for eagerly at the moment and for future delivery; Ohio and Indiana, in former years extensive shippers of wheat, are this year buyers in Wisconsin and Illinois. The reason of so much interest at the other side of the Atlantic to the grain trade is, that it is a new and appreciable element of disturbances in the exchanges. If sterling bills are to be sold low, gold will decline; if sterling bills are to rise, gold will rise.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 724–726.
Pressure and securities.
Pressure in monetary circles forces even the best securities on the market; in fact, none but the least are available at such periods, and the shares of the Ocean Marine Co. have doubtless suffered with many others from this cause.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 727.
Variations between Prospectus and Articles. The
Russian Iron Works Co. (lim.)
In den Articles der Russian Iron Works Co power der directors to increase, without the shareholders, the capital of the Co. to the extent of £500,000. Nichts davon im Prospect. Daher illegal. Und shareholders repudiate the shares. Ausserdem the objects in Memorandum und Articles differ materially from those stated in Prospectus.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 728.
America. U. St. Zusatz von
All English capital which can be withdrawn from U. St. recalled, because wanted, and value of money is greater here than there. The same cause has led to the return to New York for realization of a large proportion of the 5-20 bonds, railroad shares, and other American securities held here and in Germany since the war. With the exception of some £30,000 of petroleum per week, their present exports very light, not exceeding £100,000 per week, all told. Their cotton shipments are over, the stocks left not exceeding the wants of their own manufacturers. Price in New York higher than in Liverpool und 30 May large purchases made at Liverpool for American account. Till now the proceeds of the stock of cotton on hand at the conclusion of the war, über 2 Mill. bales, furnished them the means of paying their debts to Europe. That being now exhausted, shipments of gold have commenced, schon £2 Mill. already shipped.
The Money Market Review, 2. Juni 1866. S. 728/729.
Times says in City Article: „Circulars have been sent to all parts of the country with the words: ‚withdraw your deposits from – – bank‘, the name of the bank inserted being that of any special establishment to be attacked on a particular day. Papers with a similar inscription have been freely scattered in the streets and public places; and letters with forged signatures have been addressed to brokers ordering them to sell 500 shares of such and such Co etc.“
These conspirators furnish themselves with a list of the shareholders in a respectable Co, paying 10, 15, 20% p.a., examine carefully how many of the shareholders are women, clergymen etc who know nothing of commercial affairs – estimate continually how many of these poor creatures can be terrified into selling their shares at any conceivable price, |198 calculate with precision what effect this will have on the Co. itself, and if the shares on which £25 have been paid are now fairly worth £50, undertake to deliver, a fortnight hence, a given number of these shares at £40 p. share. This will probably produce the effect of inducing 1/10 of the widows, orphans etc who are proprietors to sell at £20 p. share. This reduction frightens another 1/10 into selling at £10 p. share. This further reduction brings in another tenth thankfull to sell at or below par and this will stop the concern absolutely, and reduce to beggary the remaining shareholders. Thus the „bears“ will be able to re-purchase the shares at a profit of £50 or upwards per share. The Times acquits them of all „moral delinquency“.
July 21, 1866. N. 320.
The Money Market Review, 21. Juli 1866. S. 68/69.
The Bank Rate and Bank Act. Deputation to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Watkin moved address for the appointment of Royal Commission of Enquiry into the pressure, the 10% discount etc. Deputation from Glasgow Chambers of Commerce to Disraeli mit memorial, on 18 July. Sie sagen u.a. „Only last week £200,000 shipped to France. Here 10% rate, dort 4%.[“] Mr. Graham, one of the members for Glasgow said: „There was a widespread opinion that the present system favoured the monied interest rather than mercantile.“
Neither want of capital, nor want of currency, but want of credit.
The Money Market Review, 21. Juli 1866. S. 69/70.
The Gvt. Debt to the Bank of England a Legalised
Fraud upon the Country.
The Bk. commenced its career as a „Government convenience“ by lending the whole of its capital, £1,200,000 to the State at 8% interest, with an allowance of £4000 yearly towards the cost of managing its own business. The Bank empowered to raise an equivalent amount of capital (to that lent to the State) to trade with, by the issue of B.o.E. notes, and the Gvt. contracted to pay in addition to the 8% interest on the loan, £4000 towards defraying the expenses attending the issue and management of the notes on which, in fact, the loan had been raised by the Bank. Such origin and first transaction of the B.o.E., and origin of the Gvt. Debt to the Bank, 170 years ago. This first advance has never been paid off; country, through all its vicissitudes, paying interest on that £1,200,000 to the present day and upon a number of other loans advanced from time to time by the Bank to the Gvt., together £11,015,100, the present amount of the Gvt. Debt to the Bank. Now all these advances or loans made by the Bk. to the Gvt. were raised and made by the issue of banknotes, which the Gvt. authorised and empowered the Bank to issue, and to the validity of which the credit of the Gvt. itself has always, virtually stood pledged. Without that Gvt. sanction and authorisation, and the monopoly of banking and metropolitan banknote issues, the Gvt. secured to the B.o.E., that establishment could not have raised those amounts and lent them to Gvt.
The Gvt. of the country was, therefore, really raising and borrowing money from its own people, and upon its own credit; but through the medium and instrumentality of a banker, from whom it nevertheless received it as a loan, to whom accordingly it acknowledged itself indebted, and to whom it has ever since paid interest upon the amount for periods varying from 170 to 50 years, the last advance having been made in 1816. The banknotes whereon the Bank raised the money which it advanced to the Gvt have never been paid, but remained outstanding in the hands of the public upon the credit of the Bank, but virtually endorsed and guaranteed by the Gvt, down to the present moment. The banknotes actually issued in the first instance, have, of course, come in for payment, but they have all been paid only by the issue of other banknotes for the like or other accounts, in perpetual succession, and have never in any other sense been paid or redeemed. The Bk.o.E. have, therefore, received 20s. in the |199 pound upon those notes; and the Gvt. is still liable to pay them 20s. in the pound upon the whole amount, to the extent of 11 mill. and upwards. The country wanted 11 mill. and upwards of currency beyond the „current coin of the realm.“ realm“ in circulation, and having obtained these B.o.E. notes, indirectly guaranteed by Gvt., they have constantly held and retained them in circulation, and not a single note in that amount has ever been paid off. The whole has remained in permanent circulation, in the hands of the public until the present moment. The B.o.E. receives the interest upon those 11 mill. of money to which it has no claim. The Bk. can only say that they did raise and pay over to the Gvt. 11 mill., in the sense as it would be true for a billbroker or commission agent to say that he had raised and paid over the amount of the bill he had negotiated for his principal. The credit of the Gvt. gave the B.o.E. notes its currency and provided for its payment … ensured its perpetual currency without payment. Zudem during 20 years Bank expressly relieved by Gvt from that liability to pay by a special law. Shortly after the B.o.E. note was made a legal tender. By this the notes placed upon a par with the current coin of the realm. This entirely superseded all question as to their payment or convertibility. From this moment they were the inconvertible notes of the Gvt. Schon hiedurch the „Gvt. Debt to the Bank“, if it had existed before, was cancelled. It is true, that the Bk. is still nominally liable to payment on demand. But even that nominal liability does not attach to the notes issued in respect of these 11 mill., because they never come to the Bk., and cannot come in for payment, for the most disastrous pressure has never reduced the circulation so low as 11 millions, not lower than 15 or 16. Why, therefore, still claims the B.o.E. to hold the Gvt. to be its debtor to 11 mill. and upwards? Of the whole of that sum the B.o.E. did not advance one single 6d. out of its own moneys. The whole of it was raised upon its bank or promissory notes, every one of which still remains, down to the present moment, wholly unpaid and unredeemed. But received interest from Gvt. upon them, as if it had really paid the whole of them. Its note circulation has never been less than the Gvt. debt, but, on the contrary, it has at all times been greater than that debt. The credit, which held them in continuous circulation and exempted them from payment, was the Gvt. credit; and of legislature Acts.
The Money Market Review, 21. Juli 1866. S. 70/71.
Among the winners by panics the banking and money lending class, und that wary and wealthy fraternity who keep their resources at command when the storm threatens, and use them freely when the hurricane comes.
We have seen quite enough lately of the infamous prostitution of the Court of Chancery by nominal shareholders in joint stock Cos to feel certain that it has been abused, not in the interest of shareholders, but to swell the illgotten gains of gamblers upon falling markets at the cost or ruin of shareholders.
A real fright, cleverly contrived, can scarcely fail to bring down the most trustworthy joint stock bank under the existing system of time bargains.
The writer of ‚Profits of Panics‘ has substantially written the truth … there is no doubt whatever.
The Money Market Review, 21. Juli 1866. S. 71/72.
Joint Stock Co. Promoting and Financing.
Lord Chief justice of the Queen’s Bench und Special Jury occupied 3 days in case, wo der plaintiff swindler. Bernard Salomon Bernard – his original name Salomon only – had heard of a certain iron mine, at St. Columb, in Cornwall, of which Carter, banker at St. Columb, was the principal owner. He had heard also of one Gill, supposed to be a gentleman „of great influence“ in certain quarters in London. He conceived the idea of introducing the one to the other, getting up a jointstock Co., and getting himself a handsome sum from the transaction. Bernard saw Gill, represented him |200 the mine especially rich in a species of iron called „spathose“, peculiarly adapted for making steel.
It does not appear whether Carter ever authorised or empowered him to sell the mine, but Bernard assured Gill that he could get a contract for the sale of it. Gill thereupon saw Captain Blakeley respecting it, and as Blakeley was largely invested in the making of steel guns, and as the one of this mine was adapted for the manufacture of steel by the Bessemer process, the captain readily agreed to become party to the acquisition of the mine with a view to forming a jointstock Co. and working it in connection with his Ordnance Company. Bernard entered into a contract to sell, as the agent of Carter, agreed to sell the property to himself and Gill for £75,000. According to Bernard, £60,000 was to be paid to Carter, and 15,000 was to belong to himself. A Co. was then to be formed, with a nominal capital of £250,000, and a working capital of £125,000, to which Co. the promoters were to resell the mine for £125,000, and thus realise a trifling profit of £50,000 for themselves. The names of Blakeley and Bessemer were relied upon to float the Co., a financial Co. would find the money, and, as the cost of raising the iron would be only £2 p. ton, which, when converted into Steel by the Bessemer process, would be worth £100 a ton, the profits of the shareholders must be ‚prodigious‘. But, when the lawyers come to look into the matter, small difficulty discovered. Carter not the sole owner, had not solely power to sell, had never empowered Bernard to enter into contract on his behalf, and there were other parties, some of them ladies, who had never been consulted on the matter. Fresh negotiations for the sale of the property by all the parties interested at £110,000. Bernard insisted now that the name of his brother Salomon should be inserted into the contract with that of Gill, which Gill would not consent to. Captain Blakeley and the Finance Co., it was said, would not have anything to do with the concern until wholly in Gill’s hands. Gill willing to bring out the Co. in 3 months upon 3 conditions. 1) that the contract for sale be made to him; 2) ditto the negotiations for resale through him; and 3) that „we shall share the profits in equal moieties – half to me and the other half to you“. To these terms Salomon, the brother of Bernard consented, but Bernard, the brother of Salomon, refused to assert, and therefore wrote to the Finance Co. to put a stop to the arrangement. Gill thereupon declined to have anything more to do with the matter. Nothing more of the contract of sale. Nevertheless, Bernard Salomon Bernard, the plaintiff, brought action against Carter to recover „the sum of £23,750 for services in connection with the Perron Iron Mines“. Das Vieh was of course non-suited. Er hatte nur acted in the character of a purchaser, nicht an agent for the seller. Im lezten case, sagte der Chief Justice „his conduct would have been scandalous in stipulating for a share of the profits on the resale of the mine, for in that case he would have a direct interest in keeping down the price, in order to increase the difference“.
28 July 1866. N. 321.
The Money Market Review, 28. Juli 1866. S. 99/100.
Banking Act of 1844 etc. Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (No Royal Commission, discussion in
Erst Watkin’s motion postponed from Friday last to Monday, Monday he was again foiled.
Reason for no Royal Commission of Inquiry „that a time of panic is not a fit one for such an investigation“. In fact, on some pretext, the inquiry is to be shirked. B. o. France does not find it necessary … to impose upon commerce 1/3 of the changes in discount as the B.o.E.
Report of the Associated Chambers of Commerce in their annual meeting in London (Febr. last) gegen den Act. Vgl. British Quarterly Review. (July 1866)
Bk. o. Fr. has reduced its interest von 4 to 31/2%. 61/2 und 7% Market Rate of Discount (Bankrate 10%) für best bills in London.|
The Money Market Review, 28. Juli 1866. S. 101.
The Drain of Capital for New
Nach Table sent von Spackman et Son to times Times:
|Cos formed||Capital authorised||Capital Offered.||Deposits.|
|Half Year ended June 30. 1865||160||£.56,302,000||£41,492,000||£.6,551,870|
|Ditto … 1866||32||8,220,000||6,635,000||1,649,000|
Company making is thus shown to be, for the time, almost extinguished.
The figures of the past 31/2 years are thus given by Spackman:
|Cos.||Capital authorised||Capital Offered.||Deposits.|
|1866. Half Year.||32||8,220,000||6,635,000||1,649,000|
|Total. 31/2 year.||864||£.371,155,500||266,871,900||£.35,245,140.|
Diese figures stellen nicht allen drain upon the resources of the country
in the shape of new investments dar; for they do not comprise foreign
and colonial loans raised partly or wholly in England, some new issues
of shares created entirely, and some new Companies omitted by Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen the illustrious Spackman.
Also zuzufügen, ohne auf 63’, 64’, 65’ Rücksicht zu nehmen, nur für First Halfyear 1866.
Foreign and Colonial Loans advertised
between 1 Jan. und 30 June
- Argentine £500,000.
- Two Egyptian: £6,321,700.
- Queensland Debentures.
- Cape of Good Hope Debentures.
- New Zealand etc
New Capital created entirely in England,
first Halfyear 1866, omitted by Spackman
- Reuters Telegram Co.
- North Eastern Railway
- Great Northern Railway
- London, Brighton etc Railway
- San Paulo debentures.
- Hercules Insurance Co.
- City Discount.
- London and North Western Railway
- Great Eastern Railway
- London and South Western Railway
- Smyrna et Cassaba Railway Debentures.
New Cos advertised in first Halfyear 1866
(omitted ditto by Spackman.)
- London Meat Consumers.
- National Coal.
- London and Suburban Land.
- Staffordshire Wheel and Axle.
- United English and Scottish life.
- South Buckley Coal.
- South Cornwall Mines.
- Buckley Mountain Co.
- Terras Open Workings Co.
- Ehehardt’s Gunpowder, Montpellier Mining.
- North Eastern Waggon.
Putting all this together, the drain upon the investment resources of U. Kingd., nominal or real, nearly as follows:
|Capital offered, as rendered by Spackman …||£6,635,000|
|Other Capital offered, not included by Spackman||12,400,000.||Summe £19,000,000.|
|Deposits, as rendered by Spackman||£.1,649,000|
|Deposits and calls||21,500,000|
|Foreign Loans partly subscribed in England to||£4,000,000|
|Calls in the same Half year 1866: for Foreign Loans in England nearly||£15,000,000|
As regards Foreign Loans, a large portion of the proceeds is remitted in arms, ships, munitions of war, machinery, and railway iron; while of the ostensible amount of capital for new Cos only a percentage ever raised and paid upon.|
The Money Market Review, 28. Juli 1866. S. 102/103.
American Money Matters. Zusatz von
Schließen (Specie Drain)
A New York Bankers’ Circular d.d. July 6 says: „The heavy specie shipments to Europe, which were going on at the date of our last circular, June 6, suddenly ceased at the close of the succeeding week, and have since been not only moderate in amount but less than the current receipts of gold and silver bullion from Australia.“ In other words, the specie drain from the U. St. to Europe has been checked by the changes in the price on gold, which on 5 June was 146, and on 5 July 153%. A fluctuation of 7% apparently separates the two periods – one of efflux, the other of stagnation – with no contraction of notes, no action on prices, and no parliamentary or other generalship to balk the enemy. The recent specie movement from the U. St. dates from 1st May. On that date, it may be fairly assumed, the first notes of alarm were sounded in private letters from England. But the U. States Treasury was then well stocked with specie, so that 35 Mill. dollars were thrown on the market, in response to the demand. Parting with that sum, the U. States Treasury withdrew from the „Gold-room“ and left the continuing wants of commerce to be provided on the usual terms of demand and supply. From 1251/2, at the opening of the „Gold-room“ on May 1st, the price was carried to 1681/2 on June 18, to recede, however, as stated, to 153 on 6. July. Thus the precious Metals were acted on in the U. St. as mere articles of commerce. Prohibitory Acts, 1st passed by State of New York (Feb. 18, 1863) prohibited loans on gold coin or bullion, 2nd , passed by Congress, (March 3, 1863) restricted the sale and price of gold; the 3d , passed by Congress (June 17, 1864) absolutely prohibited in certain cases the sale of gold. It so defeated its intended object, that formally repeated on 2nd July, 1864, 15 days only after its enactment.) At no period whatever have banknotes and coin in the U. St. stood in anything like the relation maintained in this country. So, obviously, the exchanges control themselves in the U. St. The banking in New York has been deliberately accepted by the Congress as the model for the national banking system.
The Money Market Review, 28. Juli 1866. S. 105/106.
Coal Export from Port of Newcastle von
1854 to 1864. (in Tons)
|Coastwise. Tons.||Intercolonial and Foreign.||Total.||Increase over previous Year. (Tons)||Decrease over Previous Year (Tons)|
Nur in 1858 und 1861 decrease, diese years periods of strife between masters and men in regard to wages. 1864 rendered memorable in the coal trade of Australia Colonies as the year of the great „lock out“, when the whole of the mines were laid off for a period of 8 weeks.|
The Money Market Review, 28. Juli 1866. S. 106/107.
Demand for Money and Demand for
An increase of the monetary requirements of the country is by no means synonymous with an increased demand for capital. The former does often coexist with a decrease in the demand for capital. Notably during every commercial crisis. (sc. panic.) When large failures or suspensions take place, demand für capital diminishes, demand for currency increases. These events diminish the amount of business, hence for the use of capital on loan. The suspended firms cease business, the distrust occasioned induces other forms to contract their operations. Hence demand for capital lessened. But the monetary requirements of the commercial classes increase. Bills, by means of which trade is carried on, become temporarily distrusted. The bills of all merchants connected in business mit den suspended firms are looked upon with distrust both by the banks and by the public. The parties dealing with such firms refuse to accept bills from them and require payment in banknotes. Hence increased supply of banknotes required, although the ordinary amount of business is diminished. But such increase of banknotes only to be obtained from the B.o.E. But when increased demand for its notes, Bank raises the rate of discount. Legal limit of notes, decrease of reserves points to the approximation to that limit. Hence raising of rate of discount. The Bank says not: „we cannot lend so much capital“; it say: says: „we have not enough of notes wherewith to transfer the capital“ to make the loans. Thus rate of interest rises contemporaneously with a diminished demand for capital throughout the country. Every rise in the rate of discount depresses the markets, at once depreciating the value of goods of all kinds, and still further contracting credit. Hence failures and suspensions multiply, and, with every new failure, bills become more distrusted, and banknotes are more called for in payment. Another diminution in the Bank reserve of notes, up again goes the rate of discount. Thus a momentary commercial difficulty aggravated into a serious crisis, mercantile firms go down in scores, the trade of the country is immensely diminished, 10 of 1000nds of the working class thrown out of employment. The legal limitation of Banknotes has totally upset the natural course of things, and made the rate of interest to depend, not so much upon the supply of capital, and the demand for it, as upon the artificially made fluctuations in the amount of the medium (banknotes) by which capital is transferred.
August 4. 1866. N. 322.
The Money Market Review, 4. August 1866. S. 131/132.
On Tuesday last
(31. July 1866),
(member for Stockport) moved for the issue of a Royal Commission
to investigate die causes der late Pressure, the
continuance for a long period of minimum Bankrate of 10%, and the loans
at present affecting currency and banking in the U. Kingd., and to
report what alterations had become expedient thereon. The Gvt. had
previously determined not to assent to, and accordingly opposed it.
Disraeli hatte der Recent Deputation (von Glasgow)
gewissermassen diese commission versprochen. Aber Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen dull Sir Stafford Northcote (President of the Board of Trade) opposed it. (On the part of gvt.) Obgleich der Act 3 × suspended, „there is no cause for inquiry“. Traders and manufacturers throughout the land are deprived of the ordinary means of transacting their businesses, and their businesses are declining; orders are being curtailed or withdrawn, and their workpeople in considerable number deprived of their employment. The B.o.E., meanwhile, is making a market of the general distress, though every 1000 pounds it makes cost the country a million. Watkins Watkin sagte u.a., daß nicht nur Disraeli und Gladstone (vor ihm) |204 sich gewissermassen pledged for inquiry, sondern: „The Chambers of Commerce throughout the country, including those of Leeds, Manchester, and Birmingham, had associated themselves together, and memorialised the Gvt., and instructed their members to move in the matter … his sympathies were with that great mass of capitalists of the 2nd and 3d class, composed of substantial and respectable men, who, while these things were going on, were brought down to ruin from no fault of their own, and were, in fact, the victims of the laws for which they were in no way accountable.“ A 10% tax, he said, meant a tax of more than double the annual amount upon 300 Mill. £ St. It meant further, Watkins Watkin said, a depreciation in the value of commodities and securities, estimated über 100 Mill. £. St., and although that loss of course did not fall on the large capitalists who could afford to hold their property yet the smaller man, who had to meet his engagements without the power of holding them over, suffered very severely. The loss fell most heavily, not upon those most able to bear it, but upon those least able to bear it. He urged that during all this time when commerce taxes, prices depreciated, large numbers of the working classes entirely thrown out of employment, the profits of the B.o.E. largely augmented. The amount of the Rest on 9. May, 2 days before the panic, £3,237,587; whereas, on 28 July, £3,742,406, increase of no less than £504,819, being a profit of more than 1/2 mill. in 11 weeks. Ferner the advantage, für the B.o.E., shown in the improving value of Bank Stock. In 1844 the price of B.o.E. stock £195, 1847 £180, 1865, after the experience of 2 panics, no less than £250. Comments der Times hierüber on 2 August (sieh p. 189). Watkin said ferner: „during the last 20 years, 3 panics, in 1847, 1857, 1866; and if the House would look at the rates of discount and the times of their continuance at each of those periods … every succeeding panic was of greater severity than its predecessor. 1847, penal rate of discount fixed by the Gvt letter 8%, and endured for 4 weeks. 1857 the penal rate 10%, endured for 6 weeks; 1866 10%, had already endured for 3 months.“ Daher must be some cause or law at work, which, at every recurrence of these crises, aggravated their pressure. Nach Report des Committee des H. o. Lords von 1857 the labouring classes suffer most von der destruction of credit and confidence on which commercial transactions are based.
„What had the Bank done with the authority entrusted to them by Gladstone on May 11th? Our present trade was double its value in 1857.[“] The Bank had not advanced one shilling beyond the fixed amount, während in 1857, they advanced 2 Mill. l. St. the moment they received the Gvt. letter. In order to avoid infringing the Act, they „sent round and borrowed banknotes from their customers“, and were thus enabled to defeat the object of the letter, and cheat the commerce of this country. Motion seconded by Mr. Akroyd; opposed by Northcote , Fawcett , Hubbard , (bk.o.E. director, früher governor of it) und Gladstone. Alle diese fellows admitted the necessity of inquiry.
objection: that an inquiry now would be premature, would follow to too close upon the panic itself, and »that it
would«, if now constituted, »be necessary to
examine the partners and investigate the transactions and affairs of
the firms which had suffered from but survived the shock«.
Flippant remarks of
, feeble and hacknied arguments of
. Wegen absence des
Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen graussen G. J. Göschen , Debatte adjourned. Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen Elendes Argument der Times, daß banknotes merely the representatives of gold, or certificates for so much pounds of gold coined at the mint – and the 15 mill. not based upon gold? |208 Diese legal issue must be expanding and contracting je nach den requirements of the public. Der City Kerl der Times giebt in demselben Artikel zu (30 July) daß „14 mill. £ St. notes not represented by gold.“
11 August, 1866. N. 323.
The Money Market Review, 11. August 1866. S. 167–169.
Count out on Watkin’s Motion for Enquiry.
Pitiful exhibition of this country in the eyes of foreigners.
Merchants and traders who had nothing do with share speculations or
financial shares have been compelled to countermand their orders,
manufacturers obliged to discharge their workmen, trade and commerce
paralysed throughout the country, because money could not be had to meet
engagements and pay wages. Our Foreign minister wrote to our foreign
creditors, telling them that we had been overtrading and speculating,
and were in temporary difficulties. 10% rate cause of the protracted
discredit. The adjourned debate, which should have been resumed by Mr. J. B.
, on 3 August, was met by a „count out“.
Resolved to shelve all inquiry. Der
Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen würdige Northcote: „Can you, or ought you, to make money when money is scarce? … There are those who say that the money that there is in the country represents the capital, the loanable capital, or gold, or this or that or the other, for there are different theories as to what money really is … the other school says, that money is only a form of credit.“ A small amount of wit goes a long way in the H.o.C. This These empty remarks excited the laughter of the H.o.C. „It is hopeless for you to investigate practical questions tending to legislation unless you have made up your mind on which of the 2 theories you intend to proceed“ (says Northcote)[.] These different argument arguments secundum Northcote „arguments against inquiry“. Millions of money „labouriously“, Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen says the Money Market Review „and honestly Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (!) acquired by the mercantile and industrious classes, periodically filched from their pockets to enrich the pockets of the moneylender“[.] Gladstone (summus!) added that „whatever the nature of the report, he was quite sure, that so far as it dealt with principles and causes, it would not weigh with the H.o.C.“
Fawcett said that the „panic had been produced by the reckless spirit of commercial gambling which had spread itself over the country“. Gladstone (obgleich gegen inquiry) said „that commerce so far as he had observed, had been in a sound and satisfactory state. The charge of excessive speculation and recklessness was not applicable to the manner in which for some years past the general commerce of this country had been carried on.“ Gladstone further says: „we must recognise the great benefits derived from the working of this Act.“ „At any rate the convertibility of the banknote – the first object of currency laws – has been placed beyond the smallest question – not only beyond the absolute reach of dangers, but beyond the slightest taint of danger or suspicion.“ True? The suspension of the Bank Act has preserved the convertibility of the Note. The Banknote was endangered by the Bank Act during each of the 3 panics it has brought upon us, for it brought in view the bankruptcy of the Bank itself. If the doors of the Banking Department were once closed, as they would have been but for the suspension of the Act, how long does Gladstone imagine it would have taken to exhaust the gold in the issue department? When the 10 or 12 mill. of gold withdrawn, there would still be 14 mill. of notes to come in for gold, and there would be no gold to meet them. And the Bankact has preserved the Banknote!
The Money Market Review, 11. August 1866. S. 169/170.
Ministerial Opposition to any Change in the Bank
The banking interest is powerful, and as a body is identified with the
Act of 1844. The Bank has a plethora of gold, which cannot be touched,
and thus it has so long maintained a 10% rate. Zusammenfassung von Marx.
Schließen Throw the 2 departments together! It |209 is foolish to make the Bank promise to pay in gold, notes issued upon the Gvt. debt to it only!
The Money Market Review, 11. August 1866. S. 172/173.
Clearing Houses for Banking. Zusatz von
Schließen (Country Clearing)
A few years back the private bankers of London alone used the Clearing House. Then, joint stock banks admitted, and, sill still more recently, established in London a „country clearing“, but only partial in its operations at present. A country banker having cheques upon another banker in the same place presents them over the counter for payment in notes or coin, and thus, in the settlement of the account between these bankers, notes and coins are required. The London bankers settle their accounts by an interchange of cheques and bills, and this economy of notes belongs alone to the Clearing House.
, banker, honorary Secretary to the London Bankers, was
the author of the country clearing, and in June (1866 1865) read Diesen Titel
notierte Marx in „Heft 3. 1868“ der „Hefte zur Agrikultur“
(MEGA² IV/18. S. 728.12). Er exzerpierte darüber in seinen
Auszügen aus R[obert] H[ogarth] Patterson: The Science of
Finance (ebenda. S. 750.36–37 und 755.20–21).
Schließen paper upon this subject before the Statistical Society. In diesem paper Lubbock took an amount of Diese Angabe und die folgende Tabelle exzerpierte Marx bereits in seinen Auszügen aus R[obert] H[ogarth] Patterson: The Science of Finance (MEGA² IV/18. S. 750.36–37).
Schließen £23,095,000, which passed through his bank in a few days, and found that it was made up as follows:
|Cheques et bills which did not pass through the clearing||5,394,000|
|Country Notes||79 000|
These figures taken at the close of 1864, approximately represented the general average of the transactions of all clearing banks, and, upon that assumption: 70% of the whole (£700,000 in each million £) passes through the clearing house. Of the second 5,394,000 – £3,603,000 included transfers made from the account of one customer to another, and the remainder, or £1,791,000, represented cheques and bills on banks which did not clear. Also: 70% of the whole passed through the Clearing House; 94% of the whole was done without the aid of what is usually termed money – notes and coin. 6% was done in notes and coins, in the following proportions:
These figures show the proportion of the transactions of bankers which passes through the Clearing House. Subsequently, he shows the proportions made in banknotes or coin by the public in London, and the following are the figures he supplies of payments by his customers into his bank:
|Cheques and bills||£18,395,000||or 97%|
Estimated by both tests, at least 9/10 of that large portion of English commerce, settled by London bankers is performed by methods of currency other than banknotes and coin. The country clearing, established by Lubbock, |210 belongs only to a particular class of country bankers. To use Lubbock’s words: „the country banker, A, receiving a cheque drawn on another country Banker, B, sent the cheque by post direct to B. B then requested C, his banker in London, to pay the amount to D, the London correspondent of A.“ In 1858 Lubbock thought that the complication of this system might be avoided by the establishment of a central office in London, for the special purpose of clearing country cheques, established in November (1858) the Country Clearing House at London. But this economy does not yet attach to a very large proportion of provincial business. Liverpool should have its own Clearing House, for cheques and bills between Liverpool bankers, so should Manchester, Glasgow etc. The requirements of banknotes whereby commerce is expressed has been gradually reduced, relatively to the magnitude of our commerce, by the banking facilities we have described. If our commerce depended, in fact, at this moment, upon banknotes as much as in 1844, when Peel’s Act passed, it would be simply extinguished.
The Money Market Review, 11. August 1866. S. 174.
Glasgow Chamber of Commerce on Banking.
That the Bankact of 1708, limiting all banking cos., except B.o.E., to 6 partners, produced numerous weak banks, subject to failure in all times of difficulty;
the exclusive privilege of issuing banknotes in London obliges the B.o.E. – and this impracticable – to hold a stock of bullion not only for its own transactions, but for those of all other banks and financial cos;
It has led to the establishment of Great Joint Stock lending Cos., who issue credit, in all other forms, except banknotes, without obligation of holding stocks of bullion corresponding to their credit;
that, by abolishing monopoly, all banks would be on an equal footing etc.
In Scotland, proved by long experience, that the keener the competition among banks, the smaller has been the amount of banknote issues.
It is only issues of credits for 2, 3, or 6 months which, by exciting speculation, derange prices and the foreign exchanges.
August 18. 1868. N. 324.
The Money Market Review, 18. August 1866. S. 191/192.
Reduction of Bankrate of Discount to 8%
The Times said: that „as to the rate of discount, the circumstance of its being so high showed that a high rate of profit was being realised, and that again showed that both capital and labour were meeting with a bountiful reward.“ Herr Hubbard in der bisher erwähnten Debatte (gegen Watkin) in H.o.C.: „If the borrowers have suffered, the lenders have gained, and he begged the House to remember that, as both were citizens of the same country, the gain as well as the loss would be felt throughout the empire.“ Er läugnet, daß high rate of interest could impede large mercantile transactions and arrest the employment of labour. Schön, da: the avowed purpose and object of the currency school, by the high interest, consequent upon the operations of the Bank Act, to contract mercantile operations and diminish the employment of labour, and to force the sale of the stocks of commodities on hand at reduced prices. „throughout the past quarter (sagt Times of 17 August) trade has been working, so to speak, half time.“ |211 „Everyone“, sagt die Times ib., „– bankers, merchants, manufacturers – gave as little credit, kept as small a stock, and did as limited a trade as possible.“
The Money Market Review, 18. August 1866. S. 193/194.
Misrepresentation in Prospectus of Joint Stock
Action brought by the Glamorganshire Coal and Iron Co. against Mr. Irvine, shareholder, to recover amount of call made upon him. The defendant pleaded that he had been induced to become a shareholder by the fraud and misrepresentations of the plaintiff … The Co. formed in June last for the working of a coal and iron mine. In [»]prospectus stated that the estimated quantity of coal in the mine was 7,000,000 tons, that the value of the mine was £48,000, that the probable annual produce of coal would be 93,000 tons; the annual profit upon the coal £14,000 and upon the iron £12,700; minimum dividend 10%, payable halfyearly.« These representations false and fraudulent. According to the report of a committee of inquiry, quantity of coal only 1,500,000 tons; the coal not worth the cost of raising, or at best inconsiderable profit; no profit to be made upon the iron, consequently impossible these could be any dividend payable to the shareholders. The defendant called evidence on those points, also showed that £10,000 had been paid to the attorneys for getting up the Co; that the whole concern was enormously in debt, and in fact insolvent; the only parties who had derived any benefit from the Co. were the attorneys and their friends, the directors; that „dummy“ shareholders had been got up to a large amount; and that by such means the shares had been worked up to a fictitious value when in fact and reality they were worth nothing whatever. Of course verdict for defendant against the Co. Letztre, durch ihren Secretair, gab zu, daß die £10,000 paid to the attorneys – for getting up the Co. A Mr. Baylis, who had been managing director, had got £1000 a year. Another director (auch evidence für die Co) was compelled to admit that he had also received £200 from somebody, though „he declared he had no idea where it came from“.
The Money Market Review, 18. August 1866. S. 196/197.
Royal Insurance Co. Incendiarism.
The Royal represents an unexampled rate of increase in the life department. The sums ensured in the last 5 quinquennial periods were respectively £272,796, £.733,408, £1,655,678 und £3,439,215. At this rate the business effected in the present quinquennial period will be more than ever on record in insurance office in this country. … Incendiarism is on the increase, and amongst the potent incentives to the crime the directors of the Royal very properly enumerate in their report the „irrational competition for business among new and unskilled officers“. … The average ratio of loss which fell in 1865 on several leading fire offices was no less than 87% of the premiums received; in many offices all the profits were swallowed up, and the reserve funds seriously encroached upon. The loss of the Royal, a prominent sufferer, was 77% of the premiums received, yet gain on the years’ transactions of nearly £10000. The actual outlay made by the Royal in the payment of claims amounted to £318,946. After declaring a dividend of 171/2% on the original capital, the credit balance of the profit and loss account is found to amount to £62,076, in addition to the reserve fund of nearly 2 × that amount.
25 August, 1866. N. 325.
The Money Market Review, 25. August 1866. S. 220/221.
Railway Debentures falling due in a Money
In a circular the directors of London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Co. announce that they are unable to renew debentures which have recently matured to the amount of £400,000, or to pay the interest last month on any of their debentures; also that the Court of Chancery has appointed, on behalf of the creditors, a receiver and manager, who take the entire income of the Co., and, after payment of the working expenses, hold the residue at the order of the court. All the rolling stock, plant, and movable chattels are assigned to other creditors, to prevent their seizure and appropriation by any special creditors.|212
Debentures of railway Cos. are always falling due, in good times as well as bad. When the times good, the renewal is easy, when bad, very difficult or impossible. Laing , when chairman of the Brighton Co., attempted to correct the evil by giving a higher rate of interest for long terms of years; but longdated debentures may fall due in bad times, even if the periods of their renewal are less frequent. Then arose the notion of debenture stock (originated with the Bristol and Exeter Co) whereby the debenture debt virtually converted into a permanent stock, requiring no renewal in good or bad times. The Great Northern Co. has made wonderful use of this method of converting debenture debt into a simple annuity, the principal of which can never be demanded by the creditor. The London and North Western and other cos. have also availed themselves of it to some extent. With all this, the amount of railway debentures payable at fixed periods and now outstanding, is very large, and in a crisis such as that from which we are now emerging, has been a grievous source of difficulty and discredit. Debenture stocks are generally at a discount, and the conversion from debenture debenture bonds, the principal of which is guaranteed is, therefore, nearly impossible just now.
The Money Market Review, 25. August 1866. S. 221.
The Increase and Employment of Capital.
Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (Cos) (Law of partnership)
Not overtrading in merchandise and manufactures, which enrich rather than impoverish, but overtrading in too numerous schemes and projects, many of which are crumbling to pieces every day.
Roads and railways lock up capital irrecoverably, since they are almost valueless except for the purposes for which they are used.
What an enormous amount of capital has been dissipated by many of the Cos. which of late years have sprung up. The public fail to see that many of such cos. have their foundation not on capital but on credit, and induce those of a speculative tendency to embark in schemes neither required nor calculated to become useful or productive. It is the business of such Cos. to foster and encourage credit. … Large sums divided among the directors of such Cos und der avarice of the shareholders for large dividends.
There is a wide difference between capital as originally drawn from various channels, and concentrated for and employed in legitimate purposes, and capital swelled out to enormous proportions by premiums on shares and exorbitant dividends. There is no increase of real capital to the country under such circumstances of fictitious value.
It may be thought, prima facie, that the best law of partnership, is the one which enables persons to associate themselves together for the purposes of trade and commerce with the least amount of restrictions as to the manner in which they choose to combine. This may be the case where private partnerships alone are concerned … But public Cos., dealing with vast interests, and in which a large body of shareholders are virtually governed absolutely by a board practically irresponsible for their acts, require a certain amount of organization, and at this point the law steps in, and defines the obligations of the Co. in a rigid manner. … Die directors, Governors, proprietors der B.o.E., which is a Limited Co., only responsible to the amount of the Bankstock they hold.
1 Sept. 1866. N. 326.
The Money Market Review, 1. September 1866. S. 247/248.
Paper of Leone Levi (Prof.) read at
British Association at Nottingham. Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (Rate of Interest.)
Abolition of Usury Laws in 1839. Levi shows that during the last 20 years since Act of 1844 the average rate of interest has been progressively rising.
|Von 1845–49||Average Rate||£3||s.11||d.7|
It is not the higher average, but the sudden, frequent, and extreme fluctuations that constitutes constitute the evil of Act of 1844.|213
|During the last 37 years:||first 12 years||average about equal für Banks of England and France;|
|9 years||lower für B.o.E. than B.o.F.|
|last 15 years||higher für B.o.E. than B.o.F.|
Aber Levi giebt no sufficient reason: besonders auch nicht für difference in der Rate der B.o.E. und dem der of France. Principal Reason: Act of 44?
Die Reasons of Levi für den rise des Average in England sind:
1) Large Increase in English Trade:
- 1849 Exports: £63 Mill., 1865 £165,860,000
- 1854. Imports: 152£ Mill. 1865. 271,000,000.
Shipping has increased in the same proportion. Levi forgets, that with this increase of trade, concurrent increase in profit, wealth and amount of loanable capital. Die Advocates of the Bank Act say, that an increase of trade necessitates no increase of currency, but only an increase of capital. In one sense they are right. The same amount of currency will be sufficient, if currency eked out by an expansion of credit, and the holders of „loanable capital“ be thereby enabled to command higher rates of discount for the temporary use of it. That is the object of the arbitrary limitation upon the banknote issues, and it has answered, as shown by the higher average rate, and the extreme fluctuations. As to the increase of trade per se, so French trade in last 20 years increased in the same proportion. Dennoch in France 4%, while in England 10%, in France now 3, while in England 6%.
2) Annual Export of precious metals for the East. Zeigt nichts für den average der last 15 or 20 years. Silver did not return, but we obtained, in exchange for it, something else, which we exported to other countries for equal or greater amount of silver and gold, and, therefore, the temporary abstraction of those amounts will not account for a permanent rise.
3) Immense Number of Joint Stock Cos: In 1864 and 1865 were 832 Cos. formed mit authorised capital of £362,935,000, much of that capital invested or prepared to be invested in public works. But, the capital of a Joint Stock Co. is not so much capital taken out of the country, nor so much currency taken out of circulations; it is only so much money transferred from the names of the respective subscribers to it, at their bankers, to the credit of the Co. as their bankers. The formation of a new joint stock Co., and the aggregation of their capital, differs in no material respects, from the formation of a new firm of bankers, merchants, or traders, and the combinations of their capitals.
The Money Market Review, 1. September 1866. S. 248/249.
„Great Authorities“ on the Bank Act of
1844. Zusatz von
Schließen Money or Capital wanted? (in
(in Economist und
Zusammenfassender Kommentar von Marx.
Schließen Dieß Vieh entdeckt, daß Notes nicht Kapital sind, und daß in den Crisen nicht money, sondern capital was wanted.
The capital, bankers deal in, is in the shape of money. Money not only represents, but commands capital; therefore, the term used as synonymous with capital. If it be commodities or capital which traders want during a crisis, and not gold or banknotes, perhaps Mr. Price will tell us how it happens that gold and banknotes and not capital or commodities are always found to be the appropriate remedy? When banknotes are issued, commerce relieved, panic at end.
The Money Market Review, 1. September 1866. S. 251/252.
Great Eastern Railway. Ditto London, Chatham and
Great Eastern expended during past year on capital account more than £800,000, its receipts of capital were nearly £700,000 less at 30 June 1866 than 30 June 1865. On 30 June 1865 cash balance of more than £400,000 in hand, at 30 June. June 1866 cash account in debt more than 1 Mill. Money crisis had its effect upon Great Eastern. They have not been able to renew their debentures as they fell due, and found the utmost difficulty in paying off that part of their mortgages which fell due in the late crisis. The preference charges are this half year not met from revenue; charges have been made to capital for calling stock etc and by such means dividends, never earned, have been paid. This last half year no dividends paid, because capital account never so much overdrawn.
For last half year:
- Increase of Expenses £150,911 (£103,454 in Preference Charges, 47,452 in working expenses)
- Increase in Gross Revenue: £14,151. Balance against Dividends: £136,760.
If the Great Eastern could only banish all lawyers, contractors and engineers from their domain, they might do very good.|214
Was die London, Chatham und Dover angeht, so haben sie, instead of applying the earnings of the Beckenham and Dover Line (the socalled „general undertaking“) to the debentures of that particular section, to which they belong, applied them to the loss in the Kent Coast of the Metropolitan Extensions, the Lease of Sevenoacks Line and other matters with which the Debenture holders on the Beckenham and Dover line have nothing to do.
8 September 1866. N. 327.
The Money Market Review, 8. September 1866. S. 280/281.
English Gvt the most costly in the world, and the worst.
If we look to our legislation and administration, as affecting national defense, national finance, army and navy, Bk.o.E., railways etc, in all we shall see the same lamentable indications of utter incapacity. The „ruling families“ have lost the art of ruling, and the leading political parties the art of legislating and governing.
Besides the great leading parties of Liberal and Conservative, which
manage to impede and obstruct all legislation on general topics, the
House is split up into smaller sections, representing the particular
rights of some private interest, which in general means some special
wrong affecting the public interest. We have the great landed interest,
and the Church party, the Irish party, and the railway interest, and the
banking interest, and the director interest – comprising the directors
of the water, and gas, and other jointstocCos jointstock Cos; and these sections, by occasional combinations for the
protection of each other, can generally manage to defeat any attempt to
protect the public against their wrongdoings. We have a deficient
watersupply in India, and a defective water supply in London; both
urgent evils for years, remain urgent evils, and in consequence we have
at this moment 100dns of 1000ds dying of starvation in India, and of
1000nds either dying or subject to disease
from the foul and pestilent water supplied by unscrupulous water Cos. in
London. We want roads and railroads and canals for transit and for
irrigation in India, and we have been spending millions of money to
obtain them, but we have not obtained them, nevertheless. Our army and
navy the most costly in the world, and yet we have scarcely a ship to
send to sea to impede the passage of an invader. Sir John Pakington, one
of the great mismanagers, startled the H.o.C. by telling us that,
although we have been spending 10 mill. a year for the last 10 years, we
have no naval reserve nor ships sufficient to relieve the vessels coming
home from foreign stations! „There is“, says Mr. Scholefield, „an amount
of incompetence and almost imbecility, of confused accounts and reckless extravagant extravagance to be found in the Navy Department not to be found perhaps
Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (!) in any other part of the Gvt. Administration.[“]
Blödsinnige Jointstock Cos. Legislation. We cannot have them worked in an honest and business[-]like way when they are formed; nor get them wound up without an enormous amount of trouble and expense when they fail. Promoters can job and manage pretty much as they please until the Co. is fully formed, and the directors can job and mismanage the funds of the shareholders pretty much as they please afterwards, and the shareholders and public are comparatively helpless against both of them. The same remarks apply to our Bankruptcy Laws.
For a man to purchase a seat in the H.o.C. by the most extravagant bribery and corruption is no shame to him or disgrace to the House, but he forthwith becomes an „honourable member“ of that assembly. For merchants, and bankers, and directors, and managers of joint stock Cos to embark in the wildest speculations … with the money of others is no longer morally or commercially wrong, provided only they succeed in making themselves rich by the process. Success covers the „multitude of sins“ which the achievement involved.
The Money Market Review, 8. September 1866. S. 281.
U. States Bonds.
5-20 bonds. Their price now 73%, rate of interest 6%, payable in specie in New York, yielding to the buyer more than 8% upon the purchase price guaranteed by the Gvt. of the U. St. The principal too is redeemable at 100 at the option of that Gvt. either in 5 or 20 years from the date of issue, but at the expiration of the 20 years the redemption is |215 compulsory upon the State. Therefore, in addition to the 81/3% interest which the purchase price of 73 yields to the buyer, there remains the difference between 73 and 100, or 27%, to be made good to the buyer within perhaps 15 or 17 years. Altogether 5-10 bonds yield the investor, at present prices, a minimum of 10%.
The Money Market Review, 8. September 1866. S. 282.
Cause of its failure a run upon the Indian branches, consequent upon a telegram sent by a clique of speculators in London to India stating that the parent bank in London had stopped payment. Subscribed capital 3 Mill. St, in 60,000 shares. The last price at which business was done, 4£ p. 50£ share, upon which 25l. paid, also still liability of £25 p. share. The 4 last dividends paid 18, 22, 16, and 16% p.a., and, after the last dividend, there was stated to remain a „rest“ or surplus of undivided profits, of £510,254.
The Money Market Review, 8. September 1866. S. 282.
Paying amongst new limited Cos.
- Gloucester Co, £10 shares, all paid up. Dividend 8 to 12% p.a., market price about 113/4.
- Birmingham Waggon Co. Dividends from 61/2 to 10%, 10£ shares paid up; market value par or fractional premium.
- Scottish Waggon Co. 10 to 121/2% dividend. 10l. share paid up, market price about £14.
- Railway Carriage Co 10 to 20% dividend, of £10 shares 3£ paid, market price about 43/11.
Manufacturing Cos (Lim.)
- Hopkins, Gilks and Co (lim.) 10% div., of 15£ share 8l. 10s. paidup, market value £6, 10s.
- John Crossley and Sons (lim.) 15% div., price 18l. für 15l. share, with 10l. paid.
- Avonside Engine Co (lim.) pays 121/2 to 15%, price of £10 share mit £7 paid, 8£. p. share.
- Patent Shaft and Axle Co (Lim.) 15% p.a. from commencement, 10£ share fully paid, market price £16.
- Runcorn Soap et Alcali Co (Limit.) 15% p.a., 25£ share, 20£ paid, market price 171/2.
- Patent Nut and Bolt Co (lim.) 15%, £10 share, fully paid, market price £9.
New Marine Insurance Cos:
- British et Foreign Co (lim.) 10 to 15% p.a., 20£ shares, (2£ paid) worth 23/4. Reserve: £207,667.
- London and Provincial Marine Co (Lim.) 10 to 15%, 20£ shares, 2£ paid, worth 21/4. Reserve £125,000.
- Thames and Mersey: 10 to 20%, 20£ share, 2£ paid, with 71/4, Reserve: £527,394, or more than double the capital paid up.
The Money Market Review, 8. September 1866. S. 285.
Cotton Trade. (Prices)
Price of middling Orleans cotton at the close of August (1866) by contrast with 12 months past, now lb 14d., then 253/4d. Decline of nearly 1sh. a lb in one month. Before the American war price was 5d. or 6d. a lb … The quantity of cotton consumed by our own mills have averaged 45,610 bales per week throughout the first 8 months of this year, by contrast with 36,227 bales p. week in the same months last year, and thus far we may assume that the demand for cotton fabrics has been unusually large. Spinners bought cautiously upon a declining market, from „hand to mouth“. Questionable whether this scale of consumption will continue. Fact deserving notice, the decline in the prices of manufactured cotton goods, in which there is little or no speculation, has exceeded that in raw cotton during the last month.
Sept. 15, 1866. N. 328.
The Money Market Review, 15. September 1866. S. 303/304.
Bankact of 1844. Zusatz
Schließen (Raising Rate of Discount.) (Bonamy Price) Want of
Capital or Money?
„Economist“ etc an dem Bankact rühmen ist: »The Policy of raising the Bankrate of Discount in the
case of a foreign drain«, aber dieß nicht »the limitation of the Banknote issues in that case«.
Nun, was der Akt wirklich vorschreibt, ist die
limitation des Banknote issue, während das raising of
discount mit drain etc »is not a specific policy or mode of
proceeding prescribed or imposed by the Bank Act, but is left entirely
in the discretion of the directors, as well under the provisions of the
Act of 1844 as it was before that Act was passed, and as it would be if
that Act were now repealed.« Seit der Crise von
1783 (incl.) never any danger from apprehension
as to convertibility of note Zusatz von Marx.
Great Authority – the Kommentar von Marx.
Schließen blockhead Bonamy Price Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (!), as a director of the Turin and Savona Railway Co., of the Aberama Iron Works, and several other Joint Stock Cos. He set himself up to maintain that „the cause of the pressure in the money market was a deficiency not of sovereigns and notes, but of capital, commodities, or the products of human industry.“ He was called upon to explain, therefore, how it was that, if commodities were deficient, in relation to the demand, they did not rise in price, instead of falling in price? He is asked to say of what use commodities, instead of banknotes or sovereigns, would have been on the great day which followed the fall of Overend etc?
The Money Market Review, 15. September 1866. S. 303.
Bullion Drain. Zusatz von
Schließen (Reversion of Current)
The current of the precious metals suddenly reversed. It was recently, and has been for many years, from West to East, and it is now from East to West. The accustomed „drain of silver for the East“ is at an end, and from the East we now receive gold; while to the Unit. States we now export gold. Probable causes: 1) that our remittances for Indian cotton have exceeded what was required, especially as so large a store of raw cotton has been discovered in the U. St., and that the money is coming back again from India; 2) that our active purchases of American cotton, and of American securities „for gold by next steamer“, necessitate a preponderance of cash payments to the West.
22 September, 1866 N. 329.
The Money Market Review, 22. September 1866. S. 327/328.
Profits of Panic to the Bk.o.E.
13% p. annum dividend (20 Sept. ’66) von 1706 to present time, with single exception of 1708, when it was 121/2% p.a., the dividend had never exceeded 11% p.a., and for many years not 41/2%. If the industrious classes have lost a million, the Bankproprietors have gained it; but what of that? „they are both citizens of the same country.“ Ausser der Bk.o.E., other lenders gained many millions; but the sum total of these gains falls very short of the sum total of losses incurred. These „variations in the currency“, and the transfer of these few millions involve the depreciation and destruction of property to the amount of 100dns of millions. As these „variations“ the result of an artificial and unjust law, they are „gigantic robberies“. The plan (by Hubbard) of common citizenship would be as good in the mouth of the pickpocket and the burglar. The plundered and the plunderers are in both cases citizens of the same country.
The Money Market Review, 22. September 1866. S. 330.
Abuse and Use of Bankers[’] Deposits.
An increase in the deposits of 9 joint-stock banks in London von £8,850,774 in 1847 to £43,100,724 in 1857 was one of the prominent causes assigned by the Committee on Bank Acts for the panic of November, 1857. Of course, this the doctrine of the Bank Parlour (B.o.E.) and |217 the private banking circles opposed to the modern plan of allowing interest on deposits.
In 1866, 5 of our London Joint Stock Bank Banks held, instead of 9, more than 78 millions deposits.
|Deposits and Acceptances.
June 30 last (1866)
|London and Westminster||£.22,298,454|
|London and County||12,750,974|
The ready cash of the multitude has been accumulating gradually for some years in the hands of bankers, and by them has been utilised instead of lying idle as before. The practice has become quite an institution … The history of the recent failures among the receivers of deposits may be written in a few words. They have either lent them on insufficient securities, or in securities which cannot be realised in time of need – that is, the borrowers of deposits bound themselves to pay principal on demand or at fixed dates, and employed that principal in securities which either were not worth the money borrowed, or not realisable when most wanted – locked up.
29 September 1866. N. 330.
The Money Market Review, 29. September 1866. S. 351.
Reduction of Minimum Rate to 41/2% (27 Sept. 66’)
There is very little difference between the wealth and capital of 2 months, but the difference in the value of money by which wealth and value are expressed is more marked and sudden than at any previous period of like duration. Vor 2 months 10%, now 41/2.
With very dear money for more than 2 years, we had an enormous speculative business in Stock exchange securities, in produce of all sorts, besonders cotton, but now, with an unprecedentedly rapid fall in the value of money, promising almost nominal rates, there is an extreme absence of speculative business.
We must not have B.o.E. notes of the present character palmed off upon us as national banknotes.
The Money Market Review, 29. September 1866. S. 352/353.
Losses by Shares in Liquidation. Zusatz von
Schließen (Bankrupt private Concerns converted into
Cos. Losses upon them.[)]
After a few years of Company-making and promoting, we have entered now upon a like period of company destruction and liquidation. There are many more calls to come (from the liquidators appointed by the Court of Chancery), and this is only an early stage of much suffering. The share mania through which we have passed has been extreme, and the other extreme of depression and exhaustion is present and in prospect. Zu many new Joint Stock Banks founded; dann Finance Cos. Dann: With the aid of the share mania, numerous insolvent undertakings, perhaps otherwise doomed to bankruptcy at the next money crisis, were foisted upon the public by ingenious proprietors as solvent and prosperous; and credulous shareholders now awake to the conviction, not only that they have been deceived, but, perchance, are ruined. Daher auch Confidence into in really sound jointstock shares is wanting. There was too much confidence, now too little, but much of the distrust is fully justified.|218
|Present Loss to Original Subscribers.|
|No. of shares.||Called p. share in liquidation.|| Marx hat diese Spalte angekreuzt.
Schließen Before paid
|English Joint Stock Bk.||20,000||£4||£10||£.14||£.280,000|
|Humber Iron Works||20,000||20||20||40||800,000|
|Imp. Mercantile Credit||100,000||5||10||15||1,500,000|
|Overend, Gurney, et Co.||100,000||10||15||25||2,500,000|
|Joint Stock Discount||80,000||7l. 10s.||10||17. 10||1,800,000|
|Land Credit Co. (Ireland)||10,000||2||5||7||70,000|
Here is an absolute loss to shareholders of nearly 8 millions, and they have still much more to pay. Yet, there is not one of these Cos. that did not either spring from private undertakings of reputed wealth and prosperity, or commenced business under favourable circumstances. The distress which followed the railway mania of 1845 and 1846 was intense, and, whatever the amount of calls paid, it was, for the time, swept away in depreciated market value; but these calls were represented by some value; there was the freehold of the land, upon which the rails were laid, and the rails, the lodgings, and a certain monopoly of traffick which must belong to every railway. But in this share crisis of 1866 the money called up under liquidation is utterly lost to the contributories. It all goes to pay for losses which can never be recovered, and against which there is no asset. It is gone, too, in several cases, to pay losses long concealed, and artfully made to wear the aspect of gains, or almost wilfully contracted by reckless management. The share crisis of 1866 is, therefore, peculiarly disheartening, und daher all new shares distrusted. If the Rothschilds, the Barings, and the Glyns were now to attempt to convert their firms into limited Cos, they would scarcely find bona fide subscribers. The share of such conversions has been too palpable, and the heavy blow under which credulous shareholders now suffer has been too stirring for confidence in anything „limited“.
The Money Market Review, 29. September 1866. S. 353/354.
Depreciation of shares and Railway stock (this
The most market marked feature fall of railway stock. Railway directors, by recklessly expending the enormous sums which the public as recklessly entrusted them in Parliamentrary contests, and by undertaking schemes simply recommended by their extravagant magnificence, have forfeited all confidence which in the time of cheap money was reposed in them. Ferner: public sees that it not only exposed to mismanagement, but to chances of fraud. The system of a huge floating debt altes Uebel, must lead to the consolidation of all the floating railway debt. The issue of fictitious promises to pay will then be rendered impossible. Distrust of public promoted by announcement der North British railway Co. that they have not sufficient funds to pay the 1% dividend recently announced, and that the shareholders are to receive |219 deferred dividend warrants in lieu of cash. The fall has been rapid and disastrous, and the stocks in good and bad repute have suffered alike.
October 6, 1866. N. 331.
The Money Market Review, 6. Oktober 1866. S. 379/380.
The English Joint Stock Bank Lim.
Into this concern 5 old unlimited banks, with all their branches, were merged, premiums paid for the acquisition of all. After 18 months’ existence, proved that the old banks valueless, or worse than valueless. Concern now hopelessly bankrupt. During its 18 months published 3 Reports, with statements of account, showing great prosperity, with good dividends, endorsed by a directorate composed of most respectable gentlemen.
The Co. formed in 1864 as the South Eastern Banking Co (lim.) in order to take over the business of Messrs Mangles, carried on at Guilford and other places, and established in 1836. Capital first fixed at £500,000, in 20,000 shares of £25 each, and £5 p. share was paid up. Directors were:
James Abbiss (Alderman, City), Sir Charles W. Blunt, Baronet, Sussex, (Director of the Imperial Gas Co.), J. Canham (Ramsgate, late Burgess, Canham and Co. bankers), W. Conningham Coningham (Director of London, Brighton and South Coast Railway), A. Lawrie (Director of the City Bk.), Captain Mangles (Chairman of London and South Western Railway, and the Royal Mail Steampacket Cos.) Th. Bradshaw, Esq. (Hampton Court), Charles D. Manning (Mssrs Manning et Anderson, Lothbury), E. G. Swann (Director of the Oriental Commercial Co.) G. Young (Mssrs Begbie, Young and Begbie.)
Shortly after formation of that Co. the business of the Ramsgate Bank, carried on by Burgess and Canham, taken over. First general meeting held on 6 Feb. 1865, there announced that 15 new branches and 3 agencies had been opened, making in all 26 places of business; that the capital paid up was £95,365, Gross profits £14,118, net profits £3,364, dividend 6% p.a., leaving rest of £977. June 1865 the name of English J. St. Bank taken. July 1865 business of the Bideford Bank taken over. August 1865 second general meeting, profit declared of half year, including premiums on new shares, at £24,965, second dividend at 6% p.a declared. Sept. 1865 business of the Nottinghamshire Bank taken over, belonging to Hart, Fellows et Co, and Fellows joined the board of directors. Feb. 1866, 3d general meeting, directors declared that, in order to transact their own London business, they had acquired the old established business of Olding, Osborne et Co, and that this together with the other acquisitions „proved highly advantageous“. Gross Profit of the half year stated £46,437, dividend of 6% p.a. declared. Capital paidup at 31 Dec. 1865, was £168,525, Reserve £6,000, Deposits £901,469, Cash in hand £197,901, Securities 747,395, and other property £140,897.
On 11 May (’66, „Black Friday[“]) Bank stopped payment. In June a committee of shareholders made report to the effect that Co. was solvent at time of stoppage, and arrangements would be made to continue business. Last month the liquidators under the Court of Chancery announced first dividend of 8sh. in £; 1 October meeting for »resuscitation«, but then came the disclosures.|220
Mr. Chatters, one of the liquidators declared, that the West Surey Surrey branches ought never to have been purchased for £16,000 goodwill, and that on the day the bank stopped, or on the following day £12,000 worth of bills were abstracted from the Bank. Guilty parties not yet discovered. Half Year preceding the stoppage there was a loss on the Aldershot branch of £630, besides £6000 more in consequence of the fraudulent conduct of their manager; at Eastbourne branch 100l., and 6000 locked up as a loan to a building society etc etc[.] Total loss of the half year: £63,348. Ferner: the bank holds as security property found to have been previously mortgaged. The managers had given acceptances for £2000, of which no notice was taken. One director owed the Bank 8000£ which he could not pay. The liquidators now hold bills dishonoured for more than £100,000. Ueber 200,000£ loss, leaving out of the question the „goodwills“, for the Ramsgate, Bideford, Nottinghamshire, and London banks. Impossible to understand, how so late as last February, the capital of the Co. was in official document represented as intact, gross profit declared £46,437, dividend of 6% p.a., £3,688 written off from the cost, £5000 added to Reserve Fund, and £4,180 carried over!
The Money Market Review, 6. Oktober 1866. S. 381/382.
Spirit of Cotton Circulars. Zusatz von
Schließen (False American Rumours.)
On 1st Oct. cotton crop always underestimated. Mssrs. Ellison and Haywood remark in their circular: „Americans never admit, and of course never publish, the probability of a good harvest, until the arrivals at the ports have placed the matter beyond doubt of contradiction; and even when the receipts are heavy, they cry out that we shall soon witness a heavy falling off. During the season they ‚seriously damage‘ and sometimes ‚almost destroy‘ the crops 3 or 4 × over. The plant is punished in a variety of ways; the rain drowns it, the weeds choke it, the drought parches it, the worms devour it; or, if it escape all these and sundry other disasters, the frost kills it.“
The Money Market Review, 6. Oktober 1866. S. 382/383.
Commercial Credit and Commercial Debt
In London alone it is estimated that 6–8000 merchants and wholesale dealers carry business on, more or less, upon credit, and in the provinces and country towns, at least 30,000 more. The losses sustained by these 36–38,000 merchants and traders immense; they are computed to amount in London to at least 30 Mill. £. a year, and in the country to at least 30 Mill. a year more, making a total loss from bad debts of 60 Mill. l. Mr. Moffatt in his recent publication on the Bankrupt Act of England says: „The cost to trading community in losses by insolvency, were estimated in 1849 at 50 Mill. St.; but, considering etc and the frauds facilitated by the existing laws, as shown by the Parliamentary Returns, probable annual net loss of 100 Mill. £. St., more than 3 × the cost of the National Debt.“
From pamphlet of John Bath public accountant („On the Insurance of Merchants and Wholesale Traders’ Commercial Debts[“], London 1866), we learn that different attempts made to establish Insurance Offices for such losses. They failed all. „One Co., and then another and another was formed for this purpose; but, after very few years’ experience, found that established upon false principles, and thus serious loss was accruing.“|221
These Cos., for premium of say 10s. Per Ct. upon the total of the annual sales of the mercantile House, undertook to pay all the losses from bad debts. The creditors, therefore, were left free to trust anybody to any amount, and the imprudent firms entailed terrific losses upon the Cos, paid out of the premiums contributed by the more careful and competing neighbours. The natural result followed. The prudent firms declined to pay premiums to be expended in paying the losses of their reckless competitors, and the Cos. themselves soon obliged to wind up.
The Money Market Review, 6. Oktober 1866. S. 385/386.
Indian Banks and Banking.
Joint Stock Banking in India more than quadrupled its original value since the sudden impetus it received from the cotton famine. Originally its growth slow. Previous to 1833, the old East India Co. kept backs back. The Banks of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay brought out under the auspices of the East India Co. The Banks holding Charters from the crown are merely tolerated by the Indian Gvt, and not permitted to designate their offices in India as branches, but agencies. Their business is also restricted to exchange, deposit, and remittance. It is questionable, in a legal point of view, whether the Charters are strictly applicable to India, as limiting the liability of the shareholders to double the amount of their shares.
1809: First Joint Stock Bank established in India, viz … the Bank o. Bengal. East India Co. patronised it, took shares to a certain extent, and had the nomination of 3 members of the board of directors, such members being civil servants of the Co. 1809 dann established Bank of Madras und Bank of Bombay, in 1840; both constituted on the same principles as Bank o. Bengal, holding charters from the East India Co., limiting the liability of the shareholders to amount of their respective shares. Durch den transfer des East India Co’s property to the Crown, the latter got also the partnership in the 3 Gvt. Banks, which continues to this day; jedoch Gvt. only responsible to the amount of its shares in the Banks.
Agra and United Service Bank in 1833, and the Union Bank of Calcutta about the same time. The latter bank, having advanced a great portion of its capital upon Indigo and Sugarfactories, was obliged in a few years to succumb. The Delhi Bank (now Delhi and London) formed in 1836. In 1842 the Bank of Western India (now the Oriental Bank Corporation) was established at Bombay; in 1846, the Commercial Bank of India, in 1852, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, in London; in 1853, the Mercantile Bank of India, (Bombay, now the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China); 1860, the Central Bank of Western India; 1862 the Bank of Hindustan, China, and Japan, in London; 1864, the Asiatic Banking Corporation (originally the Bombay Joint Stock Bank), and the National Bank of India, with which the Scinde, Punjaub, and Delhi Bank is now being amalgamated. |223 During the „golden age“ of cotton, and exciting times of high prices, a great variety of large and small banking and finance Cos. sprang up, the majority of which gone or in course of being wound up.
Without the great banking element, money, no
banks; yet what blindness and infatuation is it to suppose that banking profits can be made without trade and
commerce Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen ! There may be an accumulation of money to superabundance, and banks may be established ad libitum under such circumstances; but the possession of such resources without employment for them will not pay a dividend; and when safe and legitimate employment cannot be obtained, all kinds of expedients involving risk and ruin are resorted to. Bombay, by squandering the immense money wealth poured into it, has derived little substantial benefit from it. A few years ago a modest but flourishing port of Western India, it bade fair to become, in an incredibly short space of time, as by the stroke of the magician’s wand, a City of Palaces, ambitious enough to arrest the progress of the mighty ocean itself. Back Bay under a costly scheme of reclamation, is soon doomed to be brought under the subjection of a moneyed Co. of speculators. Speculative mania in that city. All classes more or less imbued with it. New houses and public buildings crowds crowd up in rapid succession. Gay and glittering equipages within the reach of the once most humble and servile. Increase in price in all articles of daily consumption, and necessaries of life. Those dependent upon fixed incomes encumbered by high house rents and other additions to their expenditure. Still additional wealth teeming in, and, in imitation of England, gigantic credit and finance Cos spring into existence, shares of which soon attain a high premium, and enable men holding Gvt., Bank, and other appointments, on a few 100 rupees a month, who have the good fortune to realise, to a mass large fortunes, and either retire altogether, or go into business on their own account. The money amassed both by European and native speculators in, and shippers of cotton during the period of high of high prices, amounted to fabulous dimensions, taxing ingenuity to discover ways and means of employing it.
At last the commercial hurricane came, swept away many of the recent Indian banks, including now the Asiatic Banking Corporation , leaving with a few exceptions the old Banks only. This state of things traceable to the unexampled acquisition of wealth in Bombay, in particular, consequent upon the civil war in America, the high prices to which Indian cotton attained, and the misappropriation of the wealth derived therefrom. Article – cotton – 4 years ago only 4 to 5d. p. lb – rose gradually to 4 or 5 × this value. India was the largest participator in such advance, Bombay export place of the bulk of this cotton. Thus inundated with money. Such an influx of capital, within so short a period of time, never fell to the lot of any |224 place or country. One of the first applications of this superabundant capital was to manufacture banking and finance Cos of every possible character and name, and to work with the resources so lavishly bestowed in the way most likely to dissipate and render them unproductive. The native disposition for speculation and restless trading has lasted too long, and is too well known to be wondered at. Aber leading European merchants enroll themselves as directors of speculative land and finance Cos., managers and other officers of banks give up their appointments to take part in such concerns, and banks spring up in connection with them for the purposes of making advances on their shares. A Gvt bank even is tempted to depart from the rigid conditions of its charter to foster such unsound and hazardous schemes.
The banks which have held their ground have had severe trials to pass through, and having losses to contend against, consequent upon the failure of many East India houses long established, of high character and credit. Indian banking has its seasons of profitable opportunity, as well as drawbacks and disadvantages. A bank, with its head office and board of directors in London, cannot be alive at the moment to what is going on at a distance of 10,000 or 15,000 miles; much to be left to the executive on the spot, which, in many of the bank branches, consists of an inexperienced, halddespotic halfdespotic manager. Much must [be] left to their judgment and discretion. Then, nearly all our enterprising men who have founded and successfully managed Indian banks, want to return as soon as possible home. No sooner a bank set up in Bombay or Calcutta bidding fair to become a prosperous concern when than it must have its head office established in London, and run away, as it were, from the most important part of its business and most legitimate sphere of operation. A tempting salary is held out as the London manager’s income. An influential board of directors has to be got together at London, and attractive place of business rented or purchased.
13 October. 1866. N. 332.
The Money Market Review, 13. Oktober 1866. S. 409/410.
The Case of the Shareholders in Overend, Gurney et
Deficiency des old concern, when converted into Limited Liability Co. of 3 mill. The old firm had received 250,000£ in cash since the transfer of the business, besides cash to a large amount on the sale of shares at a premium, yet „when the lim. Co. stopped payment, the books showed still the deficiency at upwards of 3 Mill. £. St.[“] Alle faulen Schulden figurirten as assets „to pay the liabilities transferred to the limited Co.[“] Den faulen Schulden unter denselben Rubriken noch zugefügt durch die limited liability Co.
The Money Market Review, 13. Oktober 1866. S. 410/411.
Journal des Débats on Act of ’44.
„That system renders a panic inevitable, as soon as the public perceives that the limit (of the quantity of banknotes) is being approached. Then bankruptcies accumulate … and the entire commerce of the most opulent nation in the world struck with discredit on all the Exchanges to such a point that hardly any one at Paris, Amsterdam, Frankfort, or Hamburg will buy paper on London.“
The Money Market Review, 13. Oktober 1866. S. 413/414.
Limited Liability as Applied to Banking.
Paid plan that followed till now (last 10 years) to have only a small proportion of the capital paid up. It was done: 1) to attract shareholders by the expectation that on their part no further advance would be required; 2) by the unpaid reserve to afford a ground of confidence to creditors.
Kömmt nun call, oder its prospect, many (schlechtbeschlagne shareholders) rush to the broker. Shares are pressed on the market; the price falls, and drops lower day by day. |225 Simultaneously, another process commences. As the value of the shares drops, the depositors and customers become alarmed. As fast as they withdraw their money the shares decline lower and lower, till the final catastrophe arrives. In some cases, such was the alarm which the mere idea of raising more capital excited, that it became impossible to make a call, however imperatively required, the directors avowing that, by such a course, more money would be frightened away, on the one hand, than obtained, on the other. Where, then, to these Cos. the advantage of the uncalled margin? It has only been prejudicial to the shareholder. Depositor, perhaps secured from ultimate loss, but the long delay of liquidation etc. If Capital paid up in full , the prospect of a call could never be employed to depreciate the share. Directors and managers, knowing to be without reserve, obliged to be entirely careful in the conduct of their business. Mit a reserve, an absolutely rotten concern – da jeder, der mit ihm handelt auf die Reserve rechnet – may be patched and supported for a time by trading on the credit of others. Should a banking Co. trade on its capital, or on the credit of its shareholders?
20 October, 1866. N. 333.
The Money Market Review, 20. Oktober 1866. S. 435/436.
Overend, Gurney et Co. Fraudulent
There have been concealment, frauds and misrepresentations. The public would never have become shareholders, if they had even suspected the true state of the affairs at the time of the transfer. The old firm was at that time absolutely and irretrievably insolvent; it was worth several mill. St. less than nothing; for several years it had carried on business without any profit, at a very heavy annual loss; a large proportion of the assets they had to transfer was composed of the fictitious debts of bankrupts and insolvents and men of straw. The public believed, and were induced to believe by the prospectus, that the old concern prosperous; the goodwill cheap at 1/2 mill. St.; and that, after paying that price, the business was such „in the opinion of the directors could not fail to insure a highly remunerative return to the shareholders“. The shareholders are now seeking to be relieved from the liabilities they incurred. Contracts obtained by frauds and false representations not binding in equity. The Co. failed in May. Till now (October) the official liquidators did not disclose the true state of things, although this a necessary preliminary before settling the list of contributors. These official liquidators appointed as their solicitors, and, until within the last few days, have been acting under the legal advice of, the firm who were the solicitors also, to the old firm of Overend etc.
Three of the directors who put forth the prospecting (der new Co.) were three of the acting members of the old firm, they knew the insolvent condition of business which the Co. were purchasing; the other 4 directors ought to have ascertained it. How could they take the bad debts of the bankrupt Howard, David Leopold Lewis, and Mssrs. O’Beirne and others as assets? One paragraph of the prospectus is, indeed, to the effect that „the vendors guarantee the Co. against any loss on the assets and liabilities transferred[“]; but the guarantees were insolvent. Among the assets there were merely nominal debts based upon the accommodation bills of men of straw.|
The Money Market Review, 20. Oktober 1866. S. 436/437.
Joint-Stock Discount Co.
Scandals. Necessity for Public Official Audit of the J. St. Cos’
Not even the „unprotected female“ so helpless as jointstock cos. shareholders. Greedy and unscrupulous promoters dig their pitfalls and lay their traps to catch them, – prospectuses. The haunters of the Stock Exchange, in the guise of bulls, and bears, and stags, „make game of them“, and job them, and mercilessly slaughter them in detail as in murderous battues. Boards of directors possess themselves of their properties and funds, and use and appropriate them as they, in their ignorance and incapacity, or their cupidity and self-seeking, may please. The shrewdest adept in „artful dodging“ and „hocuss-pocussing“ is generally made the chairman and spokesman of the board; or a tinsel lord „in need of tin“ … is caught and put in the chair to keep the turbulent shareholders in order, and by timely address to repress any rising disposition to make impertinent questions about the business of the Co. or the proceedings of the board. Clever managers conceal the true position of the co. in mystifying and unmeaning reports or unintelligible balance-sheets, and accommodating auditors are very ready to certify that „all is right“ and perfectly satisfactory. At the public meetings of the Co. every shareholder who attends is expected to „conduct himself as a gentleman“; and then he learns that to be a gentleman he must be silent, submissive, and confiding, and that the most ungentlemanly conduct of which anyone can be guilty is to exhibit a curious or distrustful disposition, or to put obtrusive questions about the business of the Co., or the conduct or management of the honourable board. The shareholder knows nothing of the secret articles and private arrangements made with the promoters of the Co., and he wants to know 50 other things about its origin, progress, and prospect, but he must not inquire about them. They are all matters in the hands of „the board“, and sure to receive their best consideration. He must be content, therefore, with such information as the board may vouchsafe to give him, and the board takes care to give him as little as possible. If the shareholder becomes urgent he is treated as rude. The chairman rises with dignity, and asks if the honourable gentleman means to insinuate etc, or means to impute etc, and he is expected to shake in his shoes when told that the board would feel compelled to regard his motion as a vote of censure or of want of confidence. If he should not be sufficiently awed by this threat, there are 20 hands in the meeting ready to „bonnet“ him, or to „shut him up“ by some other summary process, lest his impertinent inquiries should lead to impolitic disclosures and unfavourable rumours which might damage the property of the shareholders in the market. If he goes to the offices of the Co, he is probably snubbed by a supercilious manager, a flippant secretary, or an impudent clerk. They are the humble servants or subservient tools of the magnificent board, he is only one of the shareholders. It may be true that the board, the manager, the officials, and the Co. itself are but the creatures of the shareholders; but all power and authority are concentrated in the board; the individual shareholder is but one of many; and, therefore, even his servants and subordinate subordinates will scarcely deign to recognise him.
The general result of all this is, that the great body of j. st. co. shareholders – the owners of the 100dns of mill. £. invested in joint-stock enterprise – are entirely without any efficient control over the use, employment, expenditure of these vast funds. A comparatively small number amongst them, who occupy the position of directors, arrogate to themselves the entire management, and exercise a virtually irresponsible power and authority over the whole. The consequence, in but too many lamentable instances – grossest mismanagement, most unscrupulous perversion of the funds to other purposes than the proper business of the Co., most reckless jobbing and extravagant expenditure, and an almost total subordination of the property and interests of the shareholders to the primary objects and designs of the directors and their associates. Hence the scandalous disclosures brought to light by the failure of the Joint-Stock-Discount-Co , in which the directors had recklessly misappropriated the capital which the shareholders had subscribed for the discounting of commercial bills to advances on so called financial securities. Hence the Overends scandals only revealed in October, months after the failure occurred. Hence the complicated commercial and financial abuses for years carried on by London Chatham Dover Railway Co.
If shareholders cannot manage their own affairs themselves, and cannot get honest and capable boards of directors to manage for them, which it is clear they cannot, the Legislature ought to provide some kind of supervision over the conduct and accounts of joint stock Cos. Independent Public Auditors, appointed by Gvt for the audit, at stated intervals, of the accounts of all joint st. Cos. Professional accountants – appointed by directors or the shareholders – as |227 the Times City Editor remarked – have acquired „such a confirmed habit of putting affairs in the light most agreeable to their clients that their reports and certificates are no longer deemed trustworthy, and are now usually received with a certain degree of allowance“.
The accounts of the Joint Stock Disct. Co. were „duly credited“. Thus the accounts of the London, Chatham and Dover Railway , down to the last period, and by one of the most eminent professional accountants in the City. It is absolutely necessary that we should have some competent and thoroughly independent body of auditors, to whom should be committed the audit and supervision of all the railway and other joint-stock cos. in the kingdom. Board of Trade ought to nominate the auditors. „The Audit Office of the Board of Trade.“
Would, with such an office, the directors of the notorious West Hartlepool Harbour Railway Co. have been able to issue 2 millions of debenture bonds in excess of their borrowing powers without detection?
In Australia the directors of all the banks and branches thereof have to deposit, quarterly or halfyearly, at the Gvt. office, a balance sheet setting forth a summary account of the assets and liabilities of the bank, the cash in notes and gold, amount of deposits, advances on bills etc, and increase or decrease in these items during the quarter or half-year just ended. These asccounts, having been audited and found regular and correct, are forthwith published in the papers of the respective locality, where the bank or its branch established.
The Money Market Review, 20. Oktober 1866. S. 437/438.
The Gain to India by our Cotton Famine.
The American civil war raised the price of cotton, shut up the Lancashire mills, starved the Lancashire operatives, caused a huge speculation, and prodigious drain of the precious metals from Gr. Brit., gave a vast National Debt to U. St. – and it has given to British India a new commercial existence. Our high prices great incentive to Indian cotton production. Bombay, the great centre of cotton dealing in India, with such comparatively small aid as the railways terminating at Bombay now confer, made huge fortunes upon the opportunity, and then Bombay lost much of what had been made. … Bombay and India have found a great necessity in Liverpool and Manchester … .
The great speculation at Bombay began in the 2nd year of the American war when the Lancashire spinners were fairly roused to a true appreciation of their position and their pressing wants. Our high prices and our urgent needs gave fabulous profits to the intermediate traders between the ryot producer, and the Manchester consumer, and Bombay and Liverpool grew nominally rich. Here (England) not only the cotton speculation, but speculation in various other forms ran riot, and collapse has followed.
At Bombay, relatively to the population, the mania set on foot by our cotton wants was of giant proportions compared to our own. Finance Cos., Banking Cos., Reclamation Cos., sent for their shares by the million to eager all others, and the quantities of shares, the premiums, and the scale of apparent gains during 3 years dwarfed our own experience of such matters into insignificance. One poor Gvt. clerc won 2 millions £ in a few months. Other poor Gvt. clercs became great directors and financiers, with millions upon millions under their control. Even the poor ryot, who always had lived from hand to mouth, and could never raise a crop without the aid of the money lender, bought his horses and his vehicles, and loaded himself and his belongings with costly jewels and ornaments of the precious metals. His crops bought and the money paid almost as soon as he sowed the seed. For fully 3 years we have paid little short of a 100 millions a year for raw cotton, and our Board of Trade returns show us that about 1/2 of that supply came from British India, which in effect signifies Bombay.|228
The collapse came of course. With it, Bombay speculators who had been millionaires in name failed en masse, together with the banks, and the finance, and all other cos. Western India is clearly roused from the lethargy of centuries. The Parsee and Hindoo are, after the cotton mania, more productive beings than they were, and have learnt to be producers, not alone for immediate wants, as of old, but to supply the wants of other nations.
Wilson saw that railways India’s greatest need, and forthwith drew up that agreement between the State and the railway cos. which has inaugurated a railway system in India.
Bombay is built on a narrow peninsula joined to the mainland by a still narrower isthmus, which, combined, constitutes one side of the spacious harbour. The commerce of the place is at present conducted in what is called „The Fort“ and, in a word, the commerce of the few narrow streets of the Fort of Bombay is the commerce of Western India. The shipping discharge their cargoes in the Bay into lighters, and again discharge them at the wharves, which are inadequate for the trade. The only extension of Bombay possible is either by building beyond the isthmus on the mainland, or by filling in shallow portions of the harbour for the erection of warehouses and wharves; and it is the supply of these pressing necessities which has called forth the various reclamation projects in which so much money has been won and lost. The reclamation of the waste lands in the harbour of Bombay is, therefore, a great want, with corresponding profits, if judiciously executed.
The Money Market Review, 20. Oktober 1866. S. 441/442.
Letter (Third) on American Railways. (Published Oct.
|Great Britain had in operation on 1st Jan. (1866)||13,000 miles of railway,||cost to that date:||413 Mill. £. St.|
|U. States at same date||35,000,||cost||278 Mill. £.|
Lance gives the following survey of the American Railways:
|System of Railways.||Group.||Cost per mile.||Earnings per mile.|
|Grand Trunk of Canada||16,522||849.9|
|New York Central||15,454||2612|
|Philadelphia and Reading.||18,201||3025.2|
|Baltimore and Ohio||15,763||1880.3|
Was die Atlantic and Great Western angeht built by capital raised in anticipation of the issue of the bonds and shares. Calculations zunächst baffled by American Civil War, and the bad credit into which American railway securities had fallen by the diversion from their professed objects of various subscriptions in the London market. The Atlantic and Great Western, at present in its infancy, only opened since a year; but its traffick receipts far exceed expectation.
As the different sections of the Atlantic and Great Western Railway were constructed, the money was for the most part borrowed in this country upon the bonds issued, and thus in the recent money-famine there was an undue pressure of sales by the lenders tending to a ridiculous depreciation of the bonds. Steady investors too became frightened, as the bonds fell, and added to the general panic by their sales.
The Money Market Review, 20. Oktober 1866. S. 444.
Foreign Loans. and Panics
Now that money is getting plentiful, rumours of foreign loans, due to the leviathans of the money market and the whole fry of premium hunters. No doubt, it is a fine thing for certain millionaire firms to take this opportunity of palming upon us loans for foreign Powers to the tune of several millions, for if they but get the English public committed to such transactions by a stiff deposit of, say, 20%, they are secure of their commission of 21/2% on the nominal amount of the said loans, of an annual percentage on payment of dividends, and of being for several years to come well in hand from from the funds of their „royal“ and „imperial“ constituents, not to mention other pickings. Then cry of overtrading, panic – a period most favourable for our plutocracy to lay out at high interest the fortunes made by financing for kings and emperors, and to make the most exorbitant demands in the way of securities. A panic follows, then a plethora of money, and then fresh loans. During all the late crisis these millionaires of European celebrity had no difficulty in getting from the continent whatever money they wanted at 3 or 4%, so that, whichever way the wind blows, it blows in at their barn door.
27 October 1866. N. 334.
The Money Market Review, 27. Oktober 1866. S. 463/464.
Overend, Gurney et Co. Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (Shareholder and Creditor.)
Mr. Denton, of firm of Maynard et Co., the new solicitors of the liquidators, depreciated any delay, mentioned that, „on recently going into a conveyancing office, he had seen a deed conveying £300,000 to 3 children in consequence of enormous liabilities to Overend, Gurney et. Co.“ … The Capital of £1,500,000 raised by the shareholders, entirely gone and entirely absorbed by the creditors; to that amount they have already benefited from the fraud upon the shareholders. The legal question not between these 2 parties. The right of the creditor is against the Co. and the Co’s Assets only. The sole question is, whether the shareholder was really a lawful member of the Co.|
The Money Market Review, 27. Oktober 1866. S. 464/465.
How is Money to be employed.
The mania of 1864 and 1865 and the attendant panic of 1866 are over. Investors some months back sold Consols and Exchequer Bills, and all the good prudent things, and bought finance and bank share and almost any „limited“ shares which appeared to promise fabulous rates of interest upon the purchase prices. There was, for a time, a vision of sudden wealth which a few months have utterly destroyed. As a rule, the mania in other shares has extended to railways. Even now, the minimum both of dividend and market value has not yet been attained in a number of cases. For the time very little railway debenture money is forthcoming from the public, as the overdrawn balances at the bankers show in the lately published accounts; and it seems quite a question whether, in some instances, revenue will not be absorbed to meet capital engagements in the absence of that constant supply of capital upon debentures.
There is little field for speculation except Indian and Colonial Railway Shares, and U. States Stock.
The Money Market Review, 27. Oktober 1866. S. 465/466.
Influence of the Weather upon the Money Market.
Since 1st August bad weather, prospect of bad harvest, and consequent depression of Stock Exchange. Why should the crops, during harvesting, depend on the atmosphere? Farmers will say that the Corn, when out, must go through a certain drying process in the open air, and if the open air will not admit of that preparation, the corn must be spoilt A coffee grower from Ceylon wrote to the Times that when his coffee crops liable to risk from rain, he placed them under cover, provided especially against such emergencies.
10 November. 1866. N. 336.
The Money Market Review, 10. November 1866. S. 519/520.
North British Railway. Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (Imitated from Hudson)
Report of Committee of Investigation. Dividends systematically paid out of capital, with the connivance of 1 or 2 subordinates, and under the direction of one guiding spirit, who has presided over all the proceedings in Parliament, all the contracting for new lines, all the manipulations of accounts, whereby dividends have been provided;
In April 1849, a Committee of Investigation upon the affairs of the Eastern Counties Railway Co. made the following statement: „It is evident that no accounts of the half year, which did not terminate until 4 January 1846, could have been completed by the 22d Dec. 1845 … when the accounts were made up in accordance with the books, they did not show that any such dividend had been earned; and, in order to justify the foregone conclusion of the Board, the traffick accounts were altered, and the expenses squared to suit the dividend, not the dividend to suit the expenses.“
Again, in April 1849, the assistant accountant of the Eastern Counties Co declared „it was a generally understood thing that capital was to bear what revenue could not.“
Again, there was a traffic manager of the Eastern Counties Co who took the half years’ account ended 4 July, 1848, to Hudson at Albertgate, and who stated to the Committee of Investigation: „Mr. Hudson directed me to tell them at the office to carry £10,000 to the ensuing half-year; that is to say to make the expenditure in the printed report appear to be £10,000 less than was actually incurred.“231
In January 1865, July 1865, Jan. 1866, July 1866, the same system of account cooking to bring out the dividend wanted. Mr. Walker, the secretary, wrote to Hodgson on 21. Febr. 1866, that the members of the Finance Committee „charged with the duty of providing the ways and means for the Co.“ ought to be informed of the real state of things. To him, Hodgson, in true Palmerston Style, replies:
„As to the knowledge of the Finance Committee, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and in some cases much knowledge would be more dangerous. I think they know quite enough.“ They were thus designedly kept in the dark.
„Keep their eyes bandaged, Martin“, was the memorable trust committed by one chairman of the South Eastern Railway to the deputy chairman when he desired the shareholders should not understand the position of their property, but that hardly comes up to this bandaging of the Finance Committee of the North Brit. Railway .
Other parallel between the administrations of Hudson and Hodgson. They both have had a remarkable propensity for leases, amalgamations, and extensions. In Hudson’s case the personal motive was apparent enough. The Bristol and Birmingham, the Leeds and Bradford, the Great Northern of England, and the NewCastle and Berwick, and the Hull and Selly, were all leased and amalgamated with at, perhaps, 3 or 4 times their value; but, if so, the enhanced value of the lease or amalgamation went to someone. Mr. Hudson himself was found tolerably well charged with the shares in most of these good things before any lease or amalgamation was contemplated, excepting by himself.
The Committee of Investigation remark that the North Brit. Railway in 1844 a mere project for 58 miles of line, with capital of 1 million; it is now a system of 781 miles open for traffic, und 147 miles partly under construction, with an authorised share and loan capital of £22,210,713. The Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee have been absorbed, ditto Edinburgh and Glasgow, and other lines, and branches in all directions constructed or partly constructed. Contractor influences among the directors. In einem Brief an Hodgson der Secretary insists f.i. that money would be thrown away on the Forth Bridge; that no possible traffic would compensate for the outlay; and yet the outlay was to have been made in the interest of some one, by Hodgson’s command. The directors of the Edinburgh and Glasgow Section of the North Brit. Co. resolved at recent meeting „That the Reports by the Committee of Investigation … discloses a course of systematic and fraudulent deception and deliberate falsification of accounts on the part of the chairman of that Co., by means whereof he induced this board and the shareholders of the Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway Co. to agree to an amalgamation of the two Cos., to the great detriment of the Edinburgh and Glasgow Co. … call the attention of the Lord Avocate to the report etc.“
The Money Market Review, 10. November 1866. S. 520/521.
Great Eastern Railway.
Turner, present chairman, one of the Investigation Commissioners that drove out the old directors. Now he wants 41/4 mill. £ in 61/2% preference stocks and debentures, at such a moment of general railway distrust, and of special Great Eastern discredit. Points to conclusion that, in direct antagonism to the interests of shareholders, some one or some clique has a positive interest in promoting Parliamentary Bills, and in the construction of new railways.|
The Money Market Review, 10. November 1866. S. 521/522.
A suit has been instituted by the official liquidator against the directors to hold them personally responsible, as for a breach of trust, for the loss sustained by the Co. by the investment of £30,000 in the shares of Barned’s Banking Co. The bill alleged that the Discount Co. established for carrying on the business of a bill broker and scrivener. Barned’s Bkg. Co. was formed for taking over the business of 2 old banking firms at Liverpool, and the Joint Stock Disc. Co., to aid in bringing it out, agreed to subscribe for 10,000 shares, and had 3000 shares actually allotted to them. On these shares they had paid for deposits and call £10 per share, or £30,000, and by a subsequent arrangement they agreed, in consideration of 500 shares by way of bonus, not to sell any of their shares under a certain premium before July, 1866. These transactions concealed from, and never sanctioned by, the Co. Hence the suit against the directors.
Zugleich der unglückliche Mr.
James F. Wilkinson, the late
managing director of the Co., charged mit misdemeanor. Zusatz
von Marx. Siehe S. 250.
Schließen (Verurtheilt später to penal servitude, später frei als unschuldig.)
The Money Market Review, 10. November 1866. S. 524.
Cardigan and Carmarthen Railway Co.
This week a large amount of Lloyd’s bonds of said Co. are declared to be fraudulent and valueless.
The Money Market Review, 10. November 1866. S. 524.
High price of flesh meat. Now bad prospects of bread supply. In America
no surplus available, wheat being, on the contrary, dearer at the
present moment in New York than in Europe; and the latest reports
represent the spring wheat as fully 2/3 damaged in a greater or less degree. French
have deficiency of 4 Mill. qrs. wheat, are now, with Belgian, Dutch, and
others, competing with us in the Baltic and Black Sea. Cereal harvest
everywhere bad except in Southern Russia. French have had the start of
us, as they have been enabled, by means of the Über die Entstehung einer französischen
Agrarstatistik informierte sich Marx im „Großheft 1865/1866“ der
„Hefte zur Agrikultur“ in seinen Exzerpten aus L[ouis] Mouniers
„De l’agriculture en France, d’après les documents officiel avec
des Remarques par M[aurice] Rubichon“ (Paris 1846) (siehe MEGA²
IV/18. S. 969).
Schließen system of agricultural statistics which they possess, to learn the probable deficiencies in their crops, and take prompt measures for obtaining supplies when prices were comparatively low; while we, in absence of such statistics, in being obliged to pay much higher prices, the rise in price of grain within the last 3 months 45 to 50%.
17 November 1866. N. 337.
The Money Market Review, 17. November 1866. S. 547.
Railway collapse of 1866 scarcely less memorable than that of 1845. In 1845 a railway bond holder believed he had, as security for his money, the mortgage of the freehold of a railway. In 1866 bonds not the securities they were supposed to be in 1845. Then have turned up „Lloyds Bonds“, which did not exist in 1845. In 1866 it is discovered that not one, but many railway cos. have issued bonds without any legal authority. Then have arisen question of priority; debentures, Lloyds bonds, Preference shares, ordinary shares. Lloyds bonds are only „acknowledgements of indebtedness“ (mostly paid to the contractors, contractors.) Die Carmarthen and Cardigan Railway Co. issued bonds (Lloyds) to 200,000l., in duplicate numbers. Which are legal and which not?
The Money Market Review, 17. November 1866. S. 551/552.
Large Uncalled Capitals in
Limited Liability Cos.
Disadvantage of large uncalled capitals. The practice, from 1862 to 1864, to fix the shares of the leading Cos. then formed at a high denomination, 50 to 100£ each. With a large uncalled capital you buy or sell not an asset, but a liability, with a small uncalled capital, not a liability, but a property.
Aus dieser Ausgabe
zitierte Marx zwei Stellen im Brief an Collet Dobson Collet vom
19. November 1868, die sich nicht vollständig in den
vorliegenden Exzerpten befinden.
Schließen 24 November, 1866.
The Money Market Review, 24. November 1866. S. 575/576.
The Overends. (Their
The suspense and guarantee account amounts to £4,213,896. 16s. 4d. Darunter parties, wie Atlantic Royal Mail Steam Packet Co (for £839,344), Millwall Iron Works Co. and C. J. Mare (£422,565)[,] East India and London Shipping Co (£397,653) Thomas Howard (£331,765) „Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation“ Co (144,144), David Leopold Lewis (£341,559), Nelson, Tritton and Co (291,391), J. E. C. Koch (railway accounts, actually belonging to the firm but under the care of Koch) (243,069), Lawrence and Fry (148,543)[,] T. and G. Garraway (190,977), Charles Joyce and Co (78,728) Halliday, Fox et Co (34,628) und Z. C. Pearson (35,693) – firms that had failed previous to the transfer of the business, and whose estates were then being, or had been, wound up, either in bankruptcy or arrangement. Besides these bad debts thus transferred to the new Co. as assets, the old firm were under liabilities on bills rediscounted, bills payable, credits granted, and guarantees, to the extent of £8,808,699, 8s. 3d. for which no provision was made in the arrangement. Many of these liabilities were on account of parties who had at that time failed, and upon which, therefore, it must have been well known that an ultimate loss would arise, and in respect to these the new Co. has been called upon to pay a large amount, for which no provision had been made.
The Money Market Review, 24. November 1866. S. 576/577.
|At end of 1865||At Midsummer 1866|
|Lancashire and Yorkshire||4,870,242||5,067,523|
|London and North Western||10,365,508||10,862,188|
|London, Brighton etc||2,156,285||2,500,590|
Increase in debentures outstanding during half year = £1,455,133, more than 41/2%. These 5 Cos. – specimen of their class – have enormous floating debts, the principal of which is continuously falling due. The collective debts of the 5 Cos nearly 33 mill., – that is, each Co of the five has on the average an unfunded debt nearly equal to the unfunded debt of Great Britain now outstanding in Exchequer bills … The total unfunded debt der Railways perhaps 150 to 200 millions, 20 × or 25 × the unfunded debt of Gr. Britain.
The Money Market Review, 24. November 1866. S. 577/578.
Many Cos. only brought out for the benefit of promoters and directors. The General Credit and Finance Co fairly illustrates this. Directors davon, by the articles of association, entitled to 1/10 of the net profits. Under this clause they took £15,000 for 1864, and £20,000 for 1866 for themselves. In May last, when panic, their management unequal to the occasion, and soon after call, the shares being quoted at 5 to 7sh. each. Now the directors invite the shareholders into the new Co., and ask them, by proxy (indirectly) to bind themselves to new articles of association. In diesen, N. 67 makes beyond the 1/10 of the net |234 profits, nämlich a provision for the directors „of all travelling expenses, and other actual outlay, a fixed salary of 3000l. p.a. and 1/10 of the ultimate surplus profits“.
The Russian Anglo-Dutch 5% Loan for £6,000,000.
The Money Market Review, 24. November 1866. S. 578.
Schließen Von Marx zitiert im Brief an Collet Dobson Collet vom 19. November 1868. Marx ergänzte dort einen weiteren Satz aus der Quelle, den er nicht exzerpiert hat: „It is said that English applications alone for this loan amount to between 20 and 30 millions ... there is no doubt that a very large amount of British Capital has been offered for this investment.“
Schließen It is said that the English applications alone for this loan amount to between 20 and 30 millions. Where then is Disraeli[’]s want of capital? There cannot surely be a want of capital or money upon such evidence.
The Money Market Review, 24. November 1866. S. 584.
Schließen Ein Foreign Bondholder schreibt über dasselbe Thema in diese Nummer: No sooner have we an easy money market, and no sooner do dividend paying foreign stocks, from their Money Market Review: absurdly
Schließen absolutely low prices, begin to attract the attention of people who are seeking investments, than forward come intimations of fresh foreign loans – as if enough of British Capital had not already been lent to foreign States. We thus help to depreciate the Foreign Securities we hold.
The Russian Gvt. now seek a new Five P.Ct. Loan of 6 Mill. £, at the nominal price of £86. Now Russian Five P.Ct. of the 1822 Loan were once as high as 115. Why have they fallen to 88£, their present price? There has never been any doubt as to a dividend; on the contrary, to the everlasting Credit of the Russians, the dividends were punctually paid even during the Crimean war. The reason is this, that from 1850 Russia has been continually borrowing, and instead of the one Five P.Ct. Loan of 1822, we have now no less than 5 other Russian stocks quoted on the London Stock Exchange! The same may be said of the Brazilian, Ejyptian, Peruvian, and Turkish bonds.
If this Russian Loan be floated at 86, what security is there that another will not be introduced next year at 80? And so from time to time are existing interests deteriorated. An attempt was made not long ago by Mssrs. Barings to introduce a Six p.Ct. Loan for the Argentine Republic at 75, when Buenos Ayres Six P.Ct. were at about 88. What was the consequence? Down went the price of the latter stock, because there was a rush to sell by subscribers to the new loan; but, after all, it proved to be a failure, and but a small portion of it could be floated. … It is not the thing for any State to come to us for new Loans whilst their old debts are below the prices at which they were issued, and it is too bad to seek to borrow on terms below the market value of bonds of former loans, as is the case now with Russia.
December 1. 1866. N. 339.
The Money Market Review, 1. Dezember 1866. S. 606/607.
Estate Investment Co. Misrepresentation in
Nach judgment des Vice Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood „the plaintiffs contract to take 10 shares rescinded, deposit money returned to him, his name removed from the register of the Co, the defendants to pay the costs of the suit“.
This Co. promoted by one Sarl. Purpose set forth in Prospectus to buy Land for building near metropolis etc[.] The capital of the Co was to £250,000, in 10,000 shares of £10 each, the prospectus stating that the first issue would be of „5000 shares of which more than half has been subscribed“; that upwards of 70,000£ had been expended upon the Selhurst Estate (at North Norwood) by the vendor Sarl; and that a binding contract had been entered into for the purchase of the Leyton stone Estate (within 6 miles of London etc). Alles dieß gelogen. Sarl himself (promoter und agent der directors) had agreed to take 2,510 shares. The directors told the public that they had got rid of, while Sarl was afterwards found pushing these 2,500 shares in the market, and |235 inducing the public to buy that which they were assured by the prospectus had been already taken up.
The New Russian Loan.
The Money Market Review, 1. Dezember 1866. S. 608/609.
Schließen The returns of the Banks of England and France show a glut of money … yet, so thoroughly the basis of public confidence sapped, that prices (on Stock etc Share markets) without any sign of animation. Dulness and distrust prevail, in face of the fact that the Board of Trade returns show the commerce of the country in more active condition than is generally believed. Von Marx mit Auslassungen und Ergänzungen aus der Quelle zitiert im Brief an Collet Dobson Collet vom 19. November 1868.
Schließen Holders of money are afraid – afraid, at least of all the old channels of investment, and capital is only to be tempted for the moment by foreign or colonial loan. Of this the enormous applications for the Russian, and the marked success of the New Zealand, Victoria, and Queensland Loans are proofs. Employment of this kind will not long be wanting for our capital. The Lombardo-Venetian Railway Co are about to issue bonds for £3,600,000, and doubtless several needy Governments will not delay following in the wake of the Russian. It is a gain, at all events, that there is at length some renewal of investment, and we must continue to wait patiently until the need for interest shall make itself sufficiently felt to force into employment the unremunerative hoards which are now accumulated in bankers’ vaults.
The Money Market Review, 1. Dezember 1866. S. 611/612.
Schließen The New Russian Loan „a success“; that is to say, before allotment, it has been dealt in largely at a premium, as was the case invariably a year or 2 ago with all the limited liability Cos now being wound up under the orders of the Court of Chancery. I predict, this new loan will go to a discount, as the monthly instalments of £15 become due … Its introduction has had the effect, not only of checking the rise, which was general, in all foreign stocks, but of causing a fall in Consols, and a fall of 2 to 3% in all classes of Russian bonds. It is now stated that various other foreign loans are about to be introduced, Austria is in need – also Brazil, Portugal, Italy, and, as John Bull’s coffers are once more filling, there will be no end of applications for the surplus wealth of the nation … The public for the moment care little about foreign stocks as investments, yet send in their applications for a slice of the New Russian Loan, tempted, as in the days of the late mania, by the hope of realising a premium on the scrip.
The Money Market Review, 1. Dezember 1866. S. 611.
„1915“ ist das Pseudonym eines
Verfassers einer Reihe von Leserbriefen an die „Money Market
Schließen 1915. On the Overends.
The personal guarantee was expressly given, not as against the 4 millions and upwards of the secret instrument at all, but solely against the 19 mill. and upwards of the comparatively public deed of transfer. Even the pledge of the private estates of the old firm was not to be redeemed before 31st Dec. 1868.
Aus dieser Ausgabe
zitierte Marx eine Stelle nach der Quelle im Brief an Collet
Dobson Collet vom 19. November 1868, die sich nicht in den
vorliegenden Exzerpten befindet.
Schließen 8 December 1866.
The Money Market Review, 8. Dezember 1866. S. 636–638.
Titel von Marx notiert in „Heft 3. 1868“
der „Hefte zur Agrikultur“ (MEGA² IV/18. S. 587.35), einem
Exzerptheft 1878 (IISG, Marx-Engels-Nachlass, Sign. B 148) und
im Notizbuch 1878/1879 (IISG, Marx-Engels-Nachlass, Sign. B
152). – Verzeichnet im Katalog der SPD-Bibliothek (Nr.
Schließen John Benjamin Smith, M.P. An Inquiry into
the Causes of Monetary Panics etc[.] Letter addressed to Malcolm Ross,
President of Manchester Chamber of
Commerce. London. (1866)
Nach Smith „the currency question“ is „the only question which is incomprehensible“.
(Smith was the first chairman of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and von 1839–1841, President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.)
In 1840 charges der Manchester Chamber of Commerce against B.o.E. that, against her own acknowledged rule to hold a reserve of gold in the proportion of 1/3 to its liabilities, „the directors continually acted in direct violation of their own principle – fostered speculation and overtrading by large and injudicious loans, and then, by suddenly calling them in, produced a panic, a fall in the prices of all commodities, and serious losses to the whole commercial community“. In illustration he mentions, that in 1836 Bullion of the Bank reduced to 4 Mill. St., whilst its circulation and deposits 30 Mill. £. To replenish their stock of gold, a course of restriction was commenced, resulting in panic of 1837, by which losses of capital in the 5 great staples of cotton, woollen, silk, linen, and hardware, estimated at 40 Mill. £. The same thing occurred in 1839. To remedy these evils the Bank Act of 1844 was passed, but, says Smith „22 years have since elapsed, – and the evils now complained of … appear like a mere recital of the complaints of 1840“.
, reason davon, daß die
London Joint Stock Cos. keep not large enough
money reserve. Zusammenfassung von Marx.
Schließen But, Smith, great Smith, 1847 panic! but at that time deposits in the 9 leading joint stock banks less than 9 mill. Then, Smith, 1857, panic! and the Inquiry Committee of 1857 considered the increase of deposits in the Joint Stock Banks as one of its causes, but failed to adduce any evidence – because there was none. And, finally, Zusammenfassung von Marx.
Schließen Smith, immense Smith, according to thyself, in 1866 June 30, those Joint Stock Banks denounced not only not failed, but paid 25, 29, 50 p.ct. p.a. on their respective capitals. Smith utterly fails to show that the large deposits in the Joint Stock Banks, or the amount of their reserves had anything whatever to do with the last crises. But Smith feels it a hardship, that they should have drawn so largely, at such a time, on their own balances in the B.o.E. Zusammenfassung von Marx.
Schließen But, Smith, Smith!, couldst thou complain if thy creditor drew largely upon thine reserves at the time he wants his money?
The Money Market Review, 8. Dezember 1866. S. 642.
Spirit of the Cotton Circulars.
Decline (gradual) in the price of raw cotton. Manchester manufacturers are losing money, have no confidence in current values, and begin to put their mills on short time.|
The Money Market Review, 8. Dezember 1866. S. 642–644.
Great Colliery owner und iron master; territorial magnate and powerful capitalist. Employs more than 15,000 persons, representing population of 50,000. 6 different collieries and iron works in Monmouthshire (3,254 acres of freehold land and mines; 9,352 acres of leasehold properties, besides properties in Gloucester and Somerset – the former in the Forest of Dean to the extent of 700 acres (inexhaustible coalfields), and the latter in Somersetshire to 3000 acres.[)] On its freehold and leasehold estates 2000 houses and cottages; its rental alone from lands, farms, and houses beyond 14,000 a year. 23 blast furnaces yielded 152,000 tons of pig iron annually, 100,000 tons of railway and finished iron turned out in the year. Collieries 850,000 tons of coal yearly, the mines 280,000 tons of ironstone annually. Besides, at the shipping ports there were ample appliances for a vast and increasing trade by sea. All this was private property when taken over by present Co.
The Co. among the first to apply the furnace gases to the saving of heat in the production of iron – applications that have since been carried to such perfection in South Wales, Staffordshire, and Cleveland.
December 15, 1866. N. 341.
The Money Market Review, 15. Dezember 1866. S. 667/668.
The Overends. „Justitia“ in
„Times“ (11 December) „On Commercial Morality.“
Zusammenfassende Bemerkung von
Schließen Die Times indeed defender der Overends. Ausnahmsweis for sensation sale jener Artikel. Es heißt darin u.a:
The old firm saw ruin imminent, and they seriously set themselves to the task of averting the dreadful catastrophe. They had already wasted a great part of their own fortunes, and squandered in foolish speculation 3 millions of other people’s money; what were they to do? Craft and subtlety were to be employed to stave off the evil. Their own firm was ruined, but their name was still a potent spell, and that they believed they could persuade a credulous public to buy and so to save themselves. That by this process they might bring ruin upon thousands of helpless innocent people was apparently of no consideration to these „pious bankrupts in fortune and in honour“. They determined to obtain for themselves a large sum for their name and their goodwill, and then to transfer all liabilities to the new. new Co. To do this the public had to be deceived, „and this was done in a mode that in more savage times than ours would have brought to the gallows the perpetrators of the dead.“
In the prospectus issued by the directors of the new Co. no statement of the circumstances either of the old or new co.; nothing said of the 3 millions of liabilities; no hint of the actual insolvency of the firm for whose business they engaged to give £500,000. The public were cajoled into buying shares in a concern utterly bankrupt by persons thoroughly cognisant of the |238 fraud they were committing. The private arrangement (secret article) contained a full description of the actual state of the old firm, and set forth in „damning figures“ all the liabilities and debts of the bankrupt sellers. Who, asks Justitia, are the criminals? The members of the old firm and the directors of the new Co. They concocted and executed the whole scheme, etc. „These“, he says, „are the criminals, and their crime is that of obtaining money under false and fraudulent pretenses – or swindling – and for that they ought to be placed on the criminal charge at the bar of the Old Bailey.“
The Money Market Review, 15. Dezember 1866. S. 668/669.
Titel von Marx notiert in „Heft 3. 1868“
der „Hefte zur Agrikultur“ (MEGA² IV/18. S. 587.39), einem
Exzerptheft 1878 (IISG, Marx-Engels-Nachlass, Sign. B 148) und
im Notizbuch 1878/1879 (IISG, Marx-Engels-Nachlass, Sign. B
Schließen The Crisis of 1866: A Financial Essay. By
W. Fowler. (1866.)
Defends Peel’s Act, Overstone etc. A panic, he says, is invariably the result of the opposite extreme. Too much confidence – undue inflation of credit – invariably followed by distrust, but in all cases there must be one immediate cause – one culminating point – which precedes the crises. Before the panic of 1847 great railway mania which necessitated money borrowing to an extreme extent, then panic, with the attendant export of precious metals to buy food, which was the immediate cause of suspension of Peel’s Act. Before panic of 1857 extreme speculation in the Un. States, which extended to this country, and the immediate cause of the suspension of the Bank Act then was the failure of various banks and colossal commercial houses connected with the American trade. Before the panic of 1866, great speculation in cotton, finance Cos, banks, limited liability Cos of all sorts, and in merchandise of various descriptions, and pinnacle of the crisis stoppage of Overend etc, 11 May, necessitating for 3d time the suspension of Peel’s Act.
Fowler so far right, The Money Market Review: but we cannot go
with him in his declaration
Schließen but fool when asserting: that the B.o.E. was prepared for the emergency because the Act of 1844 had compelled her to take the utmost caution in the management of her business, and that, guiding herself, by the state of her reserve, she maintained the high rate of interest which counteracted an adverse tendency in the foreign exchanges.
1) As to the necessity for a high rate of interest as a means of retaining gold in the country and of counteracting adverse foreign exchanges … B.o.E. minimum rate of discount 10% from 12 May to 15 Aug., and in that interval the Bank increased its stock of coin and bullion from less than 13 to less than 14 mill. In the same interval the B.o.F. minimum rate from 3 to 4%, but its stock of coin and bullion increased in those 3 eventful months from 201/2 to 291/4 mill. Ten % brought the B.o.E. virtually no gold at all; 3 and 4% brought the Bank of France nearly 9 mill. From 15 Aug. to now (15 Dec.) the minimum bankrate of discount at the B.o.E. reduced from 10 to 4%, and from about 14 mill. on 15. Aug. B.o.E. holds now 18 mill. It is clear that a high interest does not always attract gold; and that, after the panic of last May, it was worse than inoperative. It was mischievous to all but the B.o.E. and some other banks. Rest and dividends of B.o.E. good.|239
2) Old, old theory that „the convertibility of the note“ secured by 10% rate for 3 months, that the 10% kept enough gold, and that convertibility was never in danger. Nonsense! The convertibility was more in danger from the 10% than from any other cause. Was the convertibility of the French note in danger from 3 to 4%, while ours was 10; or with 30 mill. of gold to back it, while B.o.E. could not get half the amount with 10%. If from 12 May to 15 Aug. the B.o.E. had acted up to the letter of the law, it must have stopped payment. And then the convertibility of the Note went to the wall. It was only by throwing the Act of 1844 overboard that the Convertibility of the note was preserved.
3) Fowler tells that there must be a limitation of notes, and that the power of relaxation must rest with the minister of the day. Where existed the power of limitation in the recent crisis? Country bankers would have big B.o.E. notes in their tills so long as the 10% rate lasted, as the return made to the H.o.C. at the instance of Alderman Salomons amply shows. It was not for the B.o.E. to choose. The B.o.E., during those fatal 3 months of 10%, had outstanding obligations to pay gold on demand to an amount far larger than it had gold to pay, and all these debts might have been demanded in full at short notice. If the B.o.E. had only been a little more obstinate and a little less accommodating, their gold creditors would have demanded prompt payments, and where would the B.o.E. have been then?
Fowler says that the Bank Act of 1844 point points to a limit to the available supply of money, and thereby is a wholesome check to speculation. Might it not also be said that when the Bank coffers are full, as they are now, and will probably continue, the Act of ’44’ ’44 stimulates speculation? This law has taught us that, with 18 millions of bullion and coin in the B.o.E., we may regard money as dirt |240 cheap, and that with 12 mill. it must be at panic prices. Was there ever anything so supremely ridiculous in the shape of a law framed to regulate the commerce of the greatest commercial nation of the world?
Nummerierung von Marx.
Schließen 4) Furthermore, we are told that the limitation of banknotes relatively to the accidental stock of bullion in the Bank vaults ought to exist by law, and that the law of 1844, therefore, a wise and expedient measure. Yet, nevertheless, that some relaxing power is necessary in times of emergency, but that the power of relaxation, meaning an extension of the paper money beyond the limits of the Act of 1844, should rest, at as it now rests, with the Gvt. of the day, and not be an integral part of our Currency Law. This means, in fact, that our currency system ought to be regulated by a stringent law, but that, however stringent that law may be in easy times, it should invariably be abrogated in difficult times, and should no longer be law at all. We are told that on three occasions of 1847, 1857, and 1866, the Treasury Letter suspending the Bankact of 1844 has sufficed, „as by magic“, to stop all panic, and quickly to restore the normal state of monetary affairs; and that, as this magical suspension is sometimes imperative, a general power should be given to the First Lord of the Treasury and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give the needful authority to the Bank to suspend the law at their discretion. That is, in fact, that the law should be sustained upon the statute book, but that it should never be really put in operation. One of the aims and objects of the law of 44’ was to provide against those crise crises from one of which we have just emerged, and we are now told that whenever such emergencies arise there must be no such law at all. The law was meant to meet all such emergencies, but it is now argued by this most earnest advocate for the law that the emergency must be met by suspending the law.
Yet again we are told that a high rate of discount will not put a stop to speculative operations so long as it is profitable to pay it, but that the Act of 1844 will and does check such transactions, because in points it points out, in a way that cannot be mistaken, that there is a limit to the available supply of money in the country, and that, however good may be the bills offered, it is not certain that money will be procurable just when and to the extent required.|
The Money Market Review, 15. Dezember 1866. S. 669/670.
Lloyd’s Bonds Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (Railway Debenture)
Lloyd’s Bonds are, or ought to be, an acknowledgement, under seal, of a debt due for work performed or materials supplied, and in that form are held to be lawful; but in cases in which they have been used as a means of borrowing, as distinguished from the discharge of debt incurred before their issue, they have been held invalid.
In the last session of Parliament Law was passed rendering compulsory the public registration, on and after January 1867, of railway debentures and all other loans; and this same Act requires that after 21st January 1867 every mortgage deed, bond, and certificate of debenture stock issued shall be endorsed by 2 directors and 1 officer of the Co., with a certification that the issue is made under Parliamentary Powers. These 2 directors and the officer are liable to fine and imprisonment if they certify falsely. Presently, 45% of the net revenue is the maximum of the debenture interest, while the minimum is 73/4%, and the average less than 23%. (Dieß nach Coles’ Tables.)
Mr. Coles has prepared tables for 26 Cos (the most important:): important): In substance these figures amount broadly to the facts that the 26 Cos. have raised in all 348 Mill. St., of which 79 millions is, virtually, at this moment, in the form of debentures.
The Money Market Review, 15. Dezember 1866. S. 672/673.
Bills of Lading. Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (Frachtbriefe) (Handelsschwindel)
At the bottom of all transactions there is money. In a rough kind of way the business community may be divided into 2 great sections, the one dealing with money and the other with merchandise. The 2 live by one another. The capitalist is always ready to lend, and the merchant willing to borrow, the fundamental basis of dealing being security. This is provided by certain well known contracts formulated upon acknowledged instruments of trade, such as bills of exchange, bills of lading, dock warrants, and the like, which pass current generally „to order“, and by simple endorsement from hand to hand. These, when complete, are recognised as valued transfers of value. Bills of lading, for convenience, are drawn in sets of 2, 3, 4, and sometimes 5 parts. The number of parts is stated upon the face of each, and the captain certifies that he had signed the number indicated. The important part of the contract between the captain and all other parties to the bill of lading is that he engages to deliver the merchandise in good order, „in witness whereof the master of the said ship hath affirmed to ―― bills of lading, all of this tenor and date; the one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void“.
Now the course of dealing is ordinarily after this fashion: A merchant in India buys a parcel of cotton for which he engages to pay. He ships the purchase to London, obtains the bills of lading, and negotiates with an Exchange Bank to draw on the correspondent to whom he consigns the cotton, and assigns the shipping documents as collateral security for the due honor of his draft. In return, the banker pays the amount agreed for, which enables the merchant to meet his engagements. In other words, the bank buys the |242 bills of exchange, reserving power of recourse against all parties as well as against the goods in case of need. The bill is then remitted to the London office, and presented to the merchant’s correspondent, who, being duly advised, accepts the same. In due course the vessel arrives, and the agent sends his cotton to a storekeeper or to a dock warehouse. The storekeeper holds the cotton as bailee for the captain until payment of freight, and, after notice, for the bank who claim a lien for the advances made. The agent next pays the acceptance he has given and takes possession of the documents. He then lodges one bill of lading and a release from the captain’s claim for freight, and obtains from the storekeeper a dock warrant or wharf note, as the case may be. He then possesses a clear title to the goods, and if he should consider the markets unfavourable for immediate operation he can wait, when the certainty of being able to obtain a loan upon the document should need a rise. The storekeeper makes himself responsible for the delivery of the goods on receiving one only of the set of bills of lading, and he does this in virtue of the understanding that „one of which being accomplished the others to stand void“.
Nun schöner case of Meyerstein vs. Barber. J. C. Azemar et Co, respectable firm, lately transferred their business to one Abraham, formerly in their employ and known in London first as their manager, and afterwards as their successor. A parcel of cotton came to him drawn against in the usual manner. The cotton arrived and was landed under Abraham’s direction, but he appeared to lack the means to obtain the shipping documents. Consequently he could not deal with the merchandise, and had to contrive some scheme to meet the difficulty. He went to the bank and paid the bill by a cheque upon his own banker. He thus released the documents and immediately negotiated with Meyerstein for an advance upon them. This was successful, and, Meyerstein’s check being paid into Abraham’s credit, enabled his bankers to liquidate the cheque already given by Abraham. So far no harm done. The scheme was bold, but it had gone through, and all parties stood to come out right. But here the mischief begins. Abraham had deposited two bills of lading with Meyerstein, and one still remained in his possession. Meyerstein at this time was in the dark as to the arrival of the ship. Meanwhile, Abraham became active. He had been in communication with Mssrs. Barber as to a loan, in the first instance, but the negotiation had dropped, for want of agreement as to the amount. This was no longer of consequence, and the matter was resumed and concluded, eventually, upon Msrs. Barber’s first proposals. Every precaution was taken; the merchandise was inspected, and, being found free of all liens, the advance was made, the one bill of lading lodged, and the wharfinger issued the customary warrant. The mortgagees, being thus in possession of the cotton, sold it in their capacity of brokers and repaid themselves out of the proceeds. Part of the cotton was sold by order of Abraham, but somewhere about this part of the business he disappeared or absconded. His flight roused Meyerstein, who instituted inquiry, and finding how the case stood, made his claim on the Barber for the net proceeds of the sale, on the ground that the property in the cotton passed to him with the transfer of the 2 bills of lading.
22 December, 1866. N. 342.
The Money Market Review, 22. Dezember 1866. S. 700–702.
Overend, Gurney et. Co. Zusatz von
Schließen (Times veering
Times of 18 Dec. (’66) leading article sees nothing legally or morally wrong in the conduct of the partners of the old firm, nor of the new directors. Früher feebleness and indecision in its articles. „a disposition to wink at commercial delinquencies“, „shrinking timidity“, „moral cowardice.“ Then Justitia. Now: Fraudulent concealment and wilful and deliberate misrepresentation, for the purpose of taking the public in, if the public could not be taken in without them, are, according to the Times, neither legal crimes nor moral offences, but fair and |243 allowable mercantile transactions. That is the orthodox commercial morality of the Times.
The Money Market Review, 22. Dezember 1866. S. 702/703.
The Manchester Chamber of Commerce on the Bank Act
and the Currency.
Motion was put into the recent crisis and the working of Act of 1844.
President (Malcolm Ross) declared Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen that he was an ass, that he had received 72 pamphlets and communications on the subject (one pamphlet proposing to allow banks to issue notes, taking pig iron as a basis) and Zusammenfassung von Marx. „Mir wird von allem dem so dumm, Als ging’ mir ein Mühlrad im Kopf herum“ ist ein Ausspruch des Schülers von Mephisto in Goethes „Faust“.
Schließen daß ihm ward von all dem so dumm, als ging ihm ein Mühlrad im Kopf herum.
This the extraordinary commencement. Dann the resolution moved by Henry Ashworth, who stated he did not wish to address the meeting, not being in possession of sufficient knowledge to enable him to express any definite idea on the subject. His seconder, Mr. Bannermann seconded it, because he was of opinion the inquiry would be of „no practical use“, having made up his mind that „the crisis had been caused, not by the Bank Act, but by overtrading“. Ferguson supported because no investigation was necessary, because the public were able to judge for themselves as to the cause of the panic, the immediate cause being the failure of Overend et Co, the proximate causes the speculations of the public in the shares of the limited liability Cos, and the action of the financial Cos.
Mr. Wood thought the passing of the resolution would not be for the credit of the Manchester Chamber, for it would simply show that they in Manchester were „ignorant of the causes etc“[.] He and Ferguson full of encomiums upon the Bank Act. Dennoch he and Ferguson voted for the resolution. Wood denied that the Act had been suspended more than once. The same Wood gave the following anecdote of Lord Overstone: „On the first occasion“, he says, „he asked Lord Overstone whether the suspension of the Act was sought, and Overstone replied that the authorisation was undoubtedly right, for there existed at that period a state of panic which, if it had not been allayed, would have swept everything away before it, producing a run upon the Bank of England which might have endangered the payment of the notes in gold.“ And it is said that the Act has secured the convertibility of the note from all danger! The Act works well in raising the price of the capitalists’ money, and in lowering the price of the merchants’ and manufacturers’ goods.
Bazley, übrigens auch für den Act, said u.a: This year greater exports than ever before, but imports exceeded them by 30 Mill. £. But Bazley ought not to be ignorant of the fact that it is the balance of indebtedness, and not the balance of exports and imports which governs the exchanges, and that the balance of trade may be and frequently is against us, whilst the balance of indebtedness is greatly in our favour.
Bazley sagt selbst, daß „it was our industry that bought the gold from every market … The B.o.E. could not do it of itself; it might possibly depress prices, and compel English manufactures to be sold at very low prices, in order that gold might be bought at very high rates.“
The Money Market Review, 22. Dezember 1866. S. 708.
From the affidavit of those men (Gordon and Rennie) follows, that the Gurneys had told these
2 directors Zusatz von Marx.
Schließen (im Ganzen 7?) their damnable secret on the transfer of the business.
In the Joint Stock Cos. Act of 1862 it is laid down: „Any fraudulent statement or concealment of fact ⦗in prospectuses⦘ will subject the persons putting it forward to criminal proceedings.“|244
Is it in the power of any 8 persons, by means of the Limited Liability Act, to saddle unconscious individuals with the Debts of an insolvent firm, luring them by a flattering prospectus, whilst concealing the peril in which they are placed?
29 December 1866. N. 343.
The Money Market Review, 29. Dezember 1866. S. 731.
Bank Act of 1844. Zusatz
While we 10%, the B.o.F. 31/2 to 4%. It had not one farthing of Reserve in our acceptation of the word. That is to say, the notes issued and payable on demand in coin were generally in excess of the State Securities held and the coin and bullion in possession. The B.o.F. cares nothing for what we call „Reserve“, and yet during these 3 months accumulated an additional share of upwards of 9 Mill. £. St. … Throughout the history of the B.o.E., the smaller the Reserve of notes, coin and bullion, the larger have been the deposits and the actual circulation … It was not that the commerce of Gr. Britain wanted more notes, but that it feared there might be a stoppage of the supply altogether.
The Money Market Review, 29. Dezember 1866. S. 733/734.
The Railway Cos. Securities Act of
The money penalties against railway Cos. for non compliance with the Act singularly small, but two useful clauses. 1) the holder of a railway bond may demand a certificate from 2 directors and an officer of the Co (secretary or other officer registered at the office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Cos., authorised to sign the railway debentures of the Co.) that it is legally issued; 2) if certification wrongfully given, the directors and the officer may be imprisoned.
Saturday. Jan. 6, 1866. N. 1167.
Jan. 13, 1866. N. 1168.
January 20, 1866. N. 1,169.
January 27, 1866. N. 1170.
- Saturday. Jan. 6, 1866. N. 1167.
February 3. 1866. N. 1171.
10 February 1866. N. 1172.
17 February 1866. N. 1173.
- 17 February 1866.
N. 1173. (Fortsetzung)
24 February 1866. N. 1174.
March 3. 1866. N. 1175.
10th March, 1866. N. 1176.
March 17, 1866. N. 1177.
24. March 1866. N. 1178.
31 March 1866. N. 1179.
April 7. 1866. N. 1180.
April 14. 1866. N. 1181
April 21. 1866. N. 1182.
- April 28, 1866. N. 1183.
5 May. 1866. N. 1189.
12 May. 1866. N. 1185.
May 19, 1866. N. 1186.
26 May 1866. N. 1187.
June 2. 1866. N. 1188.
June 9. 1866. N. 1189.
June 16. 1866. N. 1190.
23 June. 1866. N. 1191.
- June 30. 1866. N. 1192.
Saturday, 7 July 1866. N. 1193.
July 14, 1866. N. 1194.
July 21. 1866. N. 1195.
July 28, 1866. N. 1196.
4 August 1866. N. 1197.
- August 11. 1866. N. 1198.
August 18, 1866. N. 1199.
August 25, 1866. N. 1200.
Saturday September 1, 1866.
8 September 1866. N. 1202.
September 15. 1866. N. 1203.
September 22, 1866. N. 1204.
September 29. 1866. N. 1205.
October 6 1866. N. 1206.
October 13. 1866. N. 1207.
Saturday. October 20. 1866. N. 1208.
October 27. 1866.
November 3. 1866. N. 1210.
November 10. 1866. N. 1211.
November 17. 1866. N. 1212.
24 November 1866. N. 1213
1. December 1866. N. 1214.
December 8. 1866. N. 1215.
15 December. 1866. N. 1216.
22 December. 1866. N. 1217.
29 December 1866. N. 1218.
January 5, 1867. N. 1219.
January 12, 1867. N. 1220.
19 January, 1867. N. 1221.
- January 26, 1867. N. 1222.
2 February 1867. N. 1223.
- 9 February, 1867. N. 1224.
16 February. 1867. N. 1225.
23 February 1867. N. 1226.
2 March 1867. N. 1227.
9 March, 1867. N. 1228.
16 March 1867. N. 1229.
- March 23, 1867. N. 1230.
March 30. 1867. N. 1231.
April 6. 1867. N. 1232.
13 April. 1867. N. 1233.
20 April. 1867. N. 1234.
27 April. 1867. N. 1235.
May 4, 1867. N. 1236.
11; 1867. N. 1237.
May 18. 1867. N. 1238.
25 May, 1867. N. 1239.
June 1. 1867. N. 1240.
June 8. 1867. N. 1241.
June 15. 1867. N. 1242.
22 June 1867. N. 1243.
June 29. 1867. N. 1244.
July 6. 1867. N. 1245.
July 13, 1867. N. 1246
20 July 1867. N. 1247.
July 27. 1867. N. 1248.
3 August 1867. N. 1249.
10 August, 1867. N. 1250.
17 August, 1867. N. 1251.
August 24, 1867. N. 1252.
31 August. 1867 N. 1253.
September 14, 1867. N. 1255.
- 21 Sept. 1867. N. 1256.
September 28, 1867. N. 1257.
October 5, 1867. N. 1258.
October 12, 1867. N. 1259.
- October 19, 1867. N. 1260.
October 26, 1867. N. 1261.
November 2. 1867. N. 1262.
9 November 1867. N. 1263.
November 16, 1867. N. 1264.
Nov. 23. 1867. N. 1265.
- 30 November, 1867. N. 1266.
- 7 December 1867. N. 1267.
December 21, 1867. N. 1269.
- December 28, 1867. N. 1270.
- Saturday. May 19. 1866. N. 311. Panic.
Bank o. E.
- Money Market. (Reserve of B.o.E.)
- The Recent Panic and Bank Act Suspension.
- The Panic and its Remedy.
- What to do with the Act of 1844?
- The Times and the
- Investors Losses from „Bear“ Frights.
- The Stock Markets of the Week.
- The Limited Liability Act of 1862.
- Railways. (don’t pay)
- The Reports of the Asiatic Banking Co., and the Bank of Hindostan, China
and Japan (Limited.)
- The Economy of B.o.E. Notes. 1000£ Notes.
- Money Market. (Reserve of B.o.E.)
- May 26, 1866. N. 312.
- The Bank of England and the London Bankers in the
Lord Clarendon on
- Transfer of Business of the Bank of London to the Consolidated Bk.
- Loss in Investments since beginning of 1866 – May
- The Stock Markets of the Week.
- What is a Five-Twenty Bond? (Neue Art Convertibility for paper
- The Annual Circular of the American
Commercial Agency. (Vehmgericht)
- Act of 1844 and Bank of England.
- A Pluralist Director.
- The Directors of failed
- The Bank of England and the London Bankers in the Panic.
- June 2, 1866. N. 313.
Hubbard, M.P. On the Bank Act and the
Currency. (Letter to the Times on 14 May.)
- The Theory of Panic etc.
- Board of Trade Returns.
- The Consolidated Bank
- American Exchanges and Grain Trade.
- Pressure and securities.
- Variations between Prospectus and Articles. The
Russian Iron Works Co. (lim.)
- America. U. St. (Trade)
- John C. G. Hubbard, M.P. On the Bank Act and the Currency. (Letter to the Times on 14 May.)
- July 21, 1866. N. 320.
- 28 July 1866. N. 321.
- August 4. 1866. N. 322.
- 11 August, 1866. N. 323.
- August 18. 1868. N. 324.
- 25 August, 1866. N. 325.
- 1 Sept. 1866. N. 326.
- 8 September 1866. N. 327.
- Sept. 15, 1866. N. 328.
- 22 September, 1866 N. 329.
- 29 September 1866. N. 330.
- October 6, 1866. N. 331.
- 13 October. 1866. N. 332.
- 20 October, 1866. N. 333.
- 27 October 1866. N. 334.
- 10 November. 1866. N. 336.
- 17 November 1866. N. 337.
- 24 November, 1866.
- December 1. 1866. N. 339.
- 8 December 1866.
- December 15, 1866. N. 341.
- 22 December, 1866. N. 342.
- 29 December 1866. N. 343.
5 January, 1867. N. 344.
12 January 1867. N. 345.
Proposed Expansive Clause in the Bank Act of
Evidence of John Henry Gurney
and Mr. Robert
before Vice-Chancellor Malins.
Cotton Market. Past and Present.
Hankey: (formerly Governor of B.o.E.) „The Principles of Banking, its Utility
and Economy; with Remarks on
the Working and Management of the Bank of
- Proposed Expansive Clause in the Bank Act of 1844.
19 January, 1867. N. 346.
26 Jan. 1867. N. 347.
February 2, 1867. N. 348.
9 February, 1867. N. 349.
. N. 350.
23 February 1867. N. 351.
2 March 1867. N. 352.
The Joint Stock Co’s Directory for 1867. London.
Charles Barker et Sons. 8, Birchin-lane.
Overends. Report of Liquidators and Report of Defence
Leeman’s Bill respecting
Dealings in Bank Shares.
Limited Liability. High Nominal Shares.
London, Chatham and Dover
Plethora of money.
London, Chatham et
Investigation Committee) (Solicitors)
- The Joint Stock Co’s Directory for 1867. London. Charles Barker et Sons. 8, Birchin-lane.
9 March, 1867. N. 353.
March 16, 1867. N. 354.
23 March. 1867. N. 355.
30 March 1867. N. 356.
April 6. 1867. N. 357.
13 April 1867. N. 358.
April 20, 1867. N. 359.
April 27, 1867. N. 360.
May 4, 1867. N. 361.
11 May 1867. N. 362.
25 May. 1867. N. 364.
June 8, 1867. N. 366.
15 June. 1867. N. 367.
22 June 1867. N. 368.
29 June. 1867. N. 369.
July 6. 1867. N. 370.
July 13. 1867. N. 371.
July 20, 1867. N. 372.
July 27. 1867. N. 373.
August 3. 1867. N. 374.
August 10. 1867. N. 375.
August 17, 1867. N. 376.
August 31, 1867. N. 378.
14 September. 1867. N. 380.
21 September, 1867. N. 381.
28 September, 1867. N. 382.
Gold mines of Victoria. (Kitto: „The
Goldminers of Victoria.“ Lond. ’67)
Expropriation of Individual
Public Debt of Russia. Consul
- Robert Knight: Letter to the
Honourable Sir Stafford Northcote on
the Present Condition of Bombay. Lond.
Limited Liability Cos formed since
- Gold mines of Victoria. (Kitto: „The Goldminers of Victoria.“ Lond. ’67) Expropriation of Individual Labour. (Property)
5 October. 1867. N. 383.
Money Market Review. 12 Oct. 1867.
- 19 October 1867. N. 385.
, 1867. N. 386
9 November, 1867. N. 388
16 November 1867. N. 389.
- 23 November 1867. N. 390
7 December 1867. N. 392.
21 Dec. 1867. N. 394.
28 December 1867. N. 395.