24 November 1866. N. 1213

The Economist, 24. November 1866. S. 1361/1362.
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Why Overends failed.

The business established early in the century, was very profitable, gab for the 5 years preceding 1860 the average net income of 190,000. But then, or rather just before, a change occurred. Samuel Gurney , the great, ✝ in 1856 und David Barclay Chapman, his nephew retired soon after the panic of 1857. Danach a more lax and less intelligent regime began 1861, where John Henry Gurney, residing in Norfolk and doing the quiet local business,  Zusammenfassung von Marx.
sah wie’s stand, interfered und decided that no profits should be divided till the bad accounts incurred were liquidated
. The unique fact remains, that the principal partners drew nothing from the firm of Overend, Gurney, et Co. for 5 years, |109 and thus arose the great sum of 940,000l., which stood to their credit in the books when the business was sold.

There were 13 large accounts open at the time of the transfer, and the partners on going into the matter estimated that there would be a loss on these of £. 2,788,000l. The details are these:

Due to Overend, G. et Co. Estimated value Deficiency
£. s. d. £. £. s. d.
Atlantic Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. 839,344 19 0 160,000 679,344 19 0
Millwail Ironworks Co. et C. J. Mare 422,565 12 5 422,565 12 5
East India and London Shipping Co. 397,653 3 10 25,000 372,653 3 10
Thomas Howard 331,765 9 13 331,765 9 3
Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. 144,144 3 11 7,000 137,144 3 11
David Leopold Lewis 341,559 13 4 182,000 159,559 13 4
Kelsson, Tritton et Co 291,391 4 2 187,000 103,891 4 2
Railways belonging to Overend, managed by J. E. C. Koch 243,069 17 1 54,000 189,069 17 1
Laurence and Fry 148,543 14 6 21,000 127,543 14 6
T. and G. Garraway 190,977 4 4 10,000 180,977 4 4
Charles Joyce and Co 78,728 10 0 62,000 16,728 10 0
Halliday, Fox et Co. 34,628 5 9 3,000 31,628 5 9
Z. C. Pearson 35,693 4 5 35,693 4 5
Total 3,500,065 2 0 711,500 2,788,565 2 0

Everybody familiar with these names has heard that „Overends“ were „deep in with them“. Viele hieltens für böswilligen City Gossip. Dieß nur der estimated loss at the time the new Co. was formed; the real loss was greater still. At the time of the transfer the total amount of „exceptional“ loans was 4,199,000l., but it was „hoped“ that the securities held against them would yield enough to reduce the ultimate deficit to 3,117,000l. Against this the partners prepared to set:

Balance to their credit in the private Ledger 940,000
Estates and other saleable property 2,320,000
Promises in Lombardstreet 45,000
Goodwill 500,000,

leaving as was supposed, 688,000l. to the Gurneys and other partners. A terrible result doubtless, the old firm thought it in August 1865, though the reality has been much worse. Since 1861 (nachdem J. H. Gurney interfered) ging nach wie vor das  Anführungszeichen und Hervorhebung von Marx.
business in Lombardstreet voran. … The sum for the goodwill has been lost. The securities for the 4 Mill. l. exceptional loans seem to have been pretty well rubbish. Even on the showing of the old partners, an immense part of their private property must be sold. This is what happened. The sale of the old partners’ property attracted attention, showed the nature of the old business, and so ruined the whole firm … The shareholders haben vielleicht a remedy against the directors of the limited Co. for negligence in valuing their security and „incommunicativeness“, to call it by no harsher word, in their prospectus. No human being certainly could have gathered from that document that the bad debt account existed, and which the directors must have just been looking at. We do not say that the shareholders would succeed against the directors; they might do so, try. But they will fail in their present resistance to their creditors. They must pay their debts, however they may have been induced to incur them.

October 19, 1867. N. 1260.

The Economist, 19. Oktober 1867. S. 1181/1182.
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The Low Price of Bank Shares and its Dangers.

Low price of Bank Shares now and high prices derselben 2 years ago. As a rule people do not keep at the bankers, without interest, more than the sum of money which they want for current expenditure, and this they must keep somewhere. If a man distrusts the old banker, he selects a new banker, and the aggregate result – the sum total of the money – on the running accounts of all banks is not diminished. Auch die interest bearing deposits, trotz low rate of interest, probably, as great or nearly as great as ever. Even at this low rate, people do not know what better to do with their money. They do not like to go into the funds at a high price. Four causes of the fall in the Prices of the Bankshares: 1) Banking far less profitable trade than it once was. Zwar nicht so fluctuating as the public quotations of the value of money would indicate. A great deal of money is employed at 5% by country bankers in the discount of local bills, which they know to be good, which are not known, and by their nature cannot be |172 known in the London market. In respect to the great London joint stock banks (and in a minor degree, to almost all other banks, too[)], they charge far less, they also give far less; lose therefore not out of their profits the whole difference of the discount. Trotzdem on the whole banking far less profitable.

2) Many banks, besonders those conspicuous banks whose shares are most watched, have greatly increased their capital. A banker, it is true, wants no capital in his own proper business; as Ricardo justly said, a banker does not begin his true business till he begins to deal with the capital of others. Aber die public demands rightly, that a banker should have a visible guarantee fund to meet the possible losses he may make with their money, and that this fund should be approximately [proportionate] to that money.

3) Leeman’s bill has put a stop to the speculative (dealing in) sale of bankshares. A low price of bankshares is the greatest of all temptations to joint stock bankers. The only mode of raising the value of the shares is to augment the dividends und, in order to augment that dividend quickly, managers take statt securities insecurities. This season of cheap money is the season for warning. It is in that sort of time that the beginnings of panics are laid; and may be laid the sooner if from any accidental cause, like this low value of their shares, bankers or other money lenders, should be unduly anxious to employ their money, and unduly regardless of the quality of the securities upon which it should be employed.


  • London. 1868.
  • 1866 „The Economist“ (Jahrgang 1866) vol. XXIV.
  • The Social Economist, 1. Oktober 1868
  • „The Economist“ (Jahrgang 1866) (Fortsetzung)
  • Jahrgang 1867.
  • Register der obigen Auszüge aus dem Economist für 1866 und 1867.
  • The „Money Market Review“. Jahrgang 1866.
  • The Money Market Review. Jahrgang 1867.
  • Register Money Market Review Jahrgänge 1866 und 1867